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PRODUCT DEFINITION, PRODUCT
INFORMATION, AND MARKET POWER:
KODAK IN PERSPECTIVE
MARK R. PATTERSON*
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,
the United States Supreme Court held that market power suffi-
cient to impose an illegal tying arrangement can, at least in
theory, derive from buyers' uncertainty regarding a product's
costs and quality. Although commentators disagree on the
implications of the Kodak decision, all seem to agree that the
opinion's emphasis on product information costs is a depar-
ture from previously accepted economic analysis of antitrust
law.
In this Article, Mark R. Patterson argues that the Kodak
decision is, in fact, economically reasonable, incorporating
into antitrust law previously neglected economic teachings
about the value of product information and its potential to
create market power. Applying these teachings to the facts of
Kodak, Professor Patterson suggests an analytical technique
for measuring information-based market power, and discusses
the implications of the inclusion of information costs as a part
of an analysis of market power. Further, Mr. Patterson argues
that Kodak is consistent with earlier Supreme Court decisions
in which the Court condemned competitors' joint restrictions
on market information.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court decided Eastman Ko-
dak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,' in which it held that sellers
can derive antitrust market power from uncertainty regarding their
products' costs and quality.2 Commentators' responses to Kodak have
ranged from the apocalyptic9 to the temperate,4 but all seem to agree
1. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
2. The facts and reasoning of Kodak are discussed in part II, infra, and the case's
treatment of the market power issue is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 57-
60. The view taken in this Article of the antitrust significance of imperfect information is
somewhat different from that which appears in Kodak. See infra notes 61-70 and accompa-
nying text.
3. See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect Information: The
Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and a Modest
Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REV. 336,373 (1993) (describing Kodak as a "disas-
ter"); Charles F. Rule, Back to the Dark Ages of Antitrust, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1992, at
A17.
4. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1709.2
(Supp. 1993); Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust ie-in Analysis After Kodak: Understanding the
Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANTrrRusT L.J. 263 (1994); George A. Hay, Is the Glass
Half-Empty or Half-Full?: Reflections on the Kodak Case, 62 AmTrRUT L.J. 177 (1993);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power in Aftermarkets: Antitrust Policy and the Kodak Case,
40 UCLA L. REv. 1447 (1993); Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic
Analysis after Kodak, 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 43 (1993).
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that the opinion, with its emphasis on product information, is a signifi-
cant departure from prior doctrine.5 Many claim that in Kodak the
Court left behind the firm ground of economic analysis espoused by
the Chicago School6 for uncharted waters of ad hoc speculation lim-
ited only by the creativity of plaintiffs' lawyers.7 Several commenta-
tors therefore contend that antitrust law will best be served if the
lower courts confine Kodak narrowly to its facts in an effort to mini-
mize its effect.8
This Article argues that Kodak did not abandon economic analy-
sis, but actually-some might say finally-incorporated into antitrust
law a body of economic teachings on product information that the
Court had previously neglected.9 The economic literature strongly
supports Kodak's implicit10 view that when obtaining information re-
5. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 3, at 336 ("In [Kodak], the United States Supreme
Court quietly revolutionized antitrust jurisprudence."). The novelty of Kodak has been a
central topic in at least two recent seminars, New Directions in Antitrust Law after Kodak
and Ticor: Market Definition, Summary Judgment, Economic Theory, and State Action,
sponsored by ALI-ABA, Philadelphia, Pa., Jan. 21-22, 1993, and Post-Chicago Economics:
New Theories-New Cases?, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal
Trade Commission, the ABA Antitrust Section, and Georgetown University Law Center,
Washington, D.C., May 26-27, 1994.
6. Lawrence T. Festa, III, Comment, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv-
ices, Inc.: The Decline and Fall of the Chicago Empire?, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 619, 620
(1993) ("[T]he economic analysis at the heart of [Chicago School jurisprudence] took a
back seat to a moderate tone of antitrust theory." (footnote omitted)); Rule, supra note 3,
at A17 (stating that "the real threat to consumers ... comes from [Kodak's] apparent
downgrading of economic analysis"); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106
HARv. L. REv. 163,328 (1992) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (describing the Court in Kodak
as "refusing to adhere to the views of the Chicago School"). For a general outline of the
tenets of the Chicago School, see Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. Rnv. 925 (1979). But see infra note 12 (citing sources that contend
the Court in Kodak did not abandon economic analysis).
7. Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 334 ("Kodak can be read as ... implying that a
triable issue on market power in derivative markets is always present whenever plaintiffs
present some evidence of nontrivial informational imperfections and switching costs.");
Jacobs, supra note 3, at 368 ("Firms seeking to shield themselves from the Kodak holding
.. have no effective form of self-defense.").
8. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 373 ("If the staggering implications of Kodak are to be
contained, lower courts must avail themselves of the few doctrinal loopholes that it leaves
open."); Festa, supra note 6, at 672 ("For reasons discussed previously.., a broad interpre-
tation [of Kodak] would be inappropriate."); Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 337 ("Thus, in
order to prevent the Court's language in Kodak from taking on 'a life of its own, quite
apart from the circumstances, facts, or reasoning, behind it,' lower courts should construe
Kodak narrowly .... ." (quoting Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of
Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRusT L.. 841, 847 (1990))).
9. The Kodak Court explicitly cited some of this economic literature. See infra note
89 and accompanying text; see also infra part III (discussing the literature in some detail).
10. Because of the posture in which the case came to it, the Court in Kodak did not
explicitly state that information costs can produce market power. See infra text accompa-
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garding products in a particular market is difficult (i.e., costly) for buy-
ers, sellers in that market have the power to impose higher prices."
In its reliance on this economic principle, the Court in Kodak contin-
ued to apply economic analysis,' 2 and its departure from the Chicago
School's approach comported with more recent advances in economic
theory. 3
Moreover, the Kodak decision is broadly consistent with the
Supreme Court's antitrust decisions in other contexts. The Court has
previously recognized, and emphasized, the importance of market in-
formation in cases in which competitors joined together to impose di-
rect restrictions on that information. In National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States,'4 for example, the Court held
impermissible "on its face" a professional society's rule that forbade
its members from providing price information until buyers had tenta-
tively agreed to purchase the members' services. 5 Similarly, in FTC
v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,'6 the Court concluded that an anti-
trust violation was established as a matter of law by the refusal of an
organization of dentists to provide x-rays to insurers for use in evalu-
ating the dentists' work.' 7 The Court based its decisions in these
cases, as in Kodak, on the anticompetitive effects that the unavailabil-
ity of information has on the functioning of markets.'" Hence, Kodak
can be read as a logical extension of the rationale of Professional En-
gineers and Indiana Federation of Dentists to a different, but analo-
gous, context.' 9
nying notes 29-46. That conclusion, however, follows from the Court's reasoning under the
usual definition of market power. See infra text accompanying notes 61-65.
11. See infra part III.
12. See Hay, supra note 4, at 184 ("[T]he [Kodak] opinion can hardly be described as a
rejection of the importance of economic analysis in antitrust. A very important factor in
the Court's rejection of Kodak's claim was an economic analysis of consumer decision
making in a world with costly information."); Gordon B. Spivack & Carolyn T. Ellis, Ko-
dak: Enlightened Antitrust Analysis and Traditional Tying Law, 62 ANRusTT LJ. 203,
206 (1993) ("The Court's rejection of economic presumptions to decide cases, however,
does not signal a rejection of economic learning. Indeed, the Court relied on economic
theory to define the scope of its factual analysis.").
13. Compare Posner, supra note 6, at 926-28 (describing the Chicago School as apply-
ing price theory) with Richard R. Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 949, 950-51 (1979) (arguing that the Chicago School neglected recent price-theory
work on such issues as information costs).
14. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
15. Id. at 683, 693. See also infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
16. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
17. Id. at 465-66. See also infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 198-201.
19. The Court in Kodak did not describe Kodak's actions as analogous to those of the
defendants in Professional Engineers and Indiana Federation of Dentists. Direct horizontal
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Kodak is thus a step toward providing a more economically sup-
portable and judicially consistent antitrust treatment of information.
The opinion does not make entirely clear, however, either the deci-
sion's economic foundation or its relationship with prior cases. No
doubt because the Court in Kodak was reviewing a summary judg-
ment decision reached after very limited discovery,2 ° it discussed in-
formation restrictions only at a very general level, and provided little
specific indication of when such restrictions should be treated as of
antitrust significance.21 Therefore an analysis is needed to identify
those particular information gaps that threaten the competitive pro-
cess; as Justice Scalia observed in his Kodak dissent, "gaps in the avail-
ability and quality of consumer information[ ] pervade real-world
markets. 22
This Article attempts both to outline the economic support for
the Kodak opinion and to provide a more detailed analysis of the is-
sues it raises. The remainder of the Article is divided into five parts.
Part II discusses the facts of Kodak and the opinion's approach to
information-cost issues. Part III provides a summary of the economic
literature on information costs, with particular reference to the sorts
of problems present in Kodak and similar cases. Part IV applies these
economic principles to the facts of Kodak in order to describe how
information-based market power can be measured, and discusses
some more general implications of the market power issue. Part V
applies the Article's information-cost analysis to several different
types of cases in which similar information-related claims have been
raised, and explains that the analysis here is consistent with the prior
decisions in those cases. Part VI concludes with some final
observations.
restrictions on market information, however, have much in common with vertical restraints
that indirectly impose information costs. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
20. The district court allowed the plaintiffs to take six depositions and to file one set of
interrogatories and one set of requests for production of documents before granting sum-
mary judgment for Kodak. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2078.
21. The same is true even of much of the commentary that is supportive of the Kodak
decision. For example, Professor Grimes provides an interesting scheme for categorizing
cases in terms of both market share and, following Kodak, market imperfections. See
Grimes, supra note 4, at 292-96. However, he provides no means of measuring informa-
tion-based market effects, stating only that a plaintiff can make a prima facie case by show-
ing that "significant market imperfections are present" and are likely to be exploited. Id.
at 296. Although Professor Grimes's classification of market imperfections as "low" or
"high" may be sufficient for his comparative examination of past tying cases, it is not suffi-
ciently specific for litigation, particularly litigation that can result in treble damages.
22. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1994]
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II. KODAK
The plaintiffs in Kodak were eighteen providers of maintenance
and repair services for Kodak copiers and related machines.z3 These
independent service organizations (ISOs) competed with Kodak in
providing service for its equipment.24 A few years after the ISOs en-
tered the service market, Kodak discontinued25 its earlier policy of
selling parts to ISOs and began to sell parts only to those owners of its
equipment who either purchased service from Kodak or performed it
themselves.26 In other words, Kodak would not sell parts to ISOs or
to Kodak equipment owners who used ISOs.27 The ISOs, unable to
obtain Kodak parts themselves or through their customers, lost busi-
ness, and some were forced to close.28
The ISOs brought suit to challenge Kodak's parts policy. Their
claim, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,29 alleged that the manu-
facturer "unlawfully tied the sale of service for Kodak machines to the
23. Id. at 2076-77. The specific machines involved were high-volume photocopiers and
micrographic equipment, used to capture and retrieve documents from microfilm. Id. at
2077 & n.1.
24. Id. at 2076-77.
25. The Court stated that Kodak changed its policy for both copiers and micrographic
equipment. Id. at 2077. However, Kodak contended that the restrictive policy had always
been in place for copiers. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 6 n.2, Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992) (No. 90-1029).
26. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2077. Kodak also entered into agreements with its outside
parts manufacturers to sell parts only to Kodak. Id. at 2078.
27. Whether Kodak would sell parts to ISOs if those ISOs owned Kodak equipment is
unclear. An ISO that owned Kodak equipment and serviced the equipment itself presuma-
bly would have fit within Kodak's classification of acceptable parts buyers.
28. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2078.
29. The district court had adopted a distinctly different interpretation, stating that the
ISOs' allegations were that Kodak had violated the antitrust laws "by restricting the sale of
replacement parts to direct Kodak equipment customers and by refusing to sell service
contracts on used equipment unless it is first inspected and brought up to standard by
Kodak." Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,402, at 60,211 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd, 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2072
(1992). As the district court saw these claims, neither described a tie. The court said that a
Kodak customer "can buy parts if he simply owns Kodak equipment," and that he "can buy
a Kodak maintenance agreement so long as his equipment qualifies." 1989-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) at 60,212.
The first of these points was apparently a straightforward misreading of the ISOs'
claims. According to the court of appeals, a customer could not gain access to Kodak parts
simply by owning Kodak equipment: "Kodak will not sell replacement parts for its equip-
ment to Kodak equipment owners unless they agree not to use ISs." Image Technical
Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072(1992). A seller's requirement that a buyer, to purchase the seller's product, must forgo
purchasing a second product from the seller's competitors is just as much a tie as a require-
ment that the buyer purchase the second product from the seller. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at
2079 ("A tying arrangement is 'an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that
[Vol. 73
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sale of parts, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act."3 The
nature of an illegal tie is outlined in the following passage from an
earlier Supreme Court case:
[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement
lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying
product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied prod-
uct that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have
preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms. When
he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.' " (quoting Northern Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (footnote omitted))).
The district court's treatment of the second allegation was also questionable. Judge
Schwarzer described Kodak's policy as an exercise of "[tihe right of a manufacturer unilat-
erally to select its customers and to refuse to sell to others." Image Technical Servs., 1989-1
rade Cases (CCH) at 60,212. A unilateral refusal to deal is generally permissible under
the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761
(1984) ("A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with
whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently."). If Judge Schwarzer's interpreta-
tion was correct, however, many ties would be removed from antitrust scrutiny, because
they could be redefined as sellers' unilateral refusals to deal with particular buyers. For
example, if it were alleged that a seller required the purchase of tied product B before it
would allow the purchase of tying product A, one could reinterpret the arrangement as one
in which the seller would sell A only to owners of B. However, if the buyer agreed to
purchase B in order to obtain A, the arrangement would be a tie. That was the case in
Kodak. As even Judge Schwarzer said, a buyer could purchase a Kodak maintenance
agreement "so long as his equipment qualifie[d]," Image Technical Servs., 1989-1 Trade
Cases (CCH) at 60,212, but that qualification required that the equipment be "brought up
to standard by Kodak." Id. at 60,211. The requirement that the buyer, in order to
purchase the maintenance agreement, make the additional purchase of the Kodak services
to bring the equipment "up to standard" is a classic tie. (It may be, of course, that for a
product such as a maintenance agreement, it would not be unreasonable to require that the
maintainer inspect and correct any initial equipment problems. That would not, however,
change the fact that the arrangement was a tie; it would merely give the tie a procompeti-
tive justification.) Cf Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., No. 93-1637, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 25459, at *113-14 (1st Cir. Sept. 14, 1994) (treating refusal to license
computer software diagnostic to any but computer owners who serviced their own equip-
ment as unilateral refusal to deal).
In any event, the district court's approach was not the one taken by the court of ap-
peals and the Supreme Court. The court of appeals noted the ISOs' contention that the
district court had "misconstrued" their theory, which was that "Kodak ha[d] tied parts to
service, not equipment to parts or parts to equipment." Image Technical Servs., 903 F.2d at
615. It was this alleged parts-service tie on which the court of appeals and the Supreme
Court focused. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2076; Image Technical Servs., 903 F.2d at 615.
30. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2078. Section 1 of the Sherman Act is codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1993); it declares illegal "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce," id., though it has
been interpreted to forbid only those restraints of trade that are not reasonable. See Board
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918). The ISOs also brought a claim under
Sherman Act § 2 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1993)), which makes
illegal the acts of persons who "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize ... trade or commerce." The § 1
claim is the focus of this Article.
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such "forcing" is present, competition on the merits in the
market for the tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act is
violated.31
Thus, the ISOs' claim was that at least some owners of Kodak equip-
ment would have preferred to purchase service for their equipment
from the ISOs, but were "forced"32 to purchase it from Kodak to gain
access to Kodak parts.
In the market for its parts, Kodak had a virtual monopoly.33
Therefore, to oppose the ISOs' tying claim Kodak had to explain why,
despite its control over the supply of its own parts, it did not have
power over consumers in the market for those parts. Kodak argued
that it lacked such power because the parts market was constrained by
conditions in the market for equipment,34 a market in which the ISOs
had not disputed that Kodak lacked power.35 Specifically, Kodak con-
tended (and the ISOs did not dispute36) that equipment buyers con-
sidered parts and service costs in deciding what brand of equipment to
purchase.37 As a result, Kodak claimed, it could not have exploited
any power it had in the parts market because to do so would have
31. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
32. The verb "force"-like its rough equivalent, "coerce," which is also sometimes
applied in this context, see, e.g., Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2094 (Scalia, J., dissenting)-is used
loosely when applied to tying. Despite Jefferson Parish's description of tying market power
as involving a "forcing" of buyers, 466 U.S. at 12, neither "forcing" nor "coercion" can
really be said to define the market power at issue; both terms merely restate the problem.
The buyer of a tied product combination always makes the choice to purchase the products
voluntarily, in the sense that the buyer prefers that choice to her other alternatives. The
essence of a tying claim is the narrowing of the buyer's alternatives through the use of
market power, so as to make unavailable some choice or choices that the buyer would have
preferred. See W. David Slawson, Excluding Competition Without Monopoly Power: The
Use of Tying Arrangements to Exploit Market Failure, 36 Ammius BULL. 457, 478-79
(1991).
33. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Kodak "held a near-
monopoly share" of the Kodak parts market); see also id. at 2081 (noting the ISOs' asser-
tion that "Kodak has control over the availability of parts it does not manufacture"); Image
Technical Servs., 903 F.2d at 616 ("[M]any Kodak parts are unique and available only from
Kodak.").
34. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2081-82; Image Technical Servs., 903 F.2d at 616-17.
35. Image Technical Servs., 903 F.2d at 616 n.3 ("[The ISOs] do not dispute Kodak's
assertion that it lacks market power in the interbrand [equipment] markets.") The ISOs
actually did attempt to contest this point before the Supreme Court. See Brief of Respon-
dents at 16-18, 32-33, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072
(1992) (No. 90-1029). Because they had not done so earlier, however, the Supreme Court
decided the case "based on the same premise as the Court of Appeals, namely, that compe-
tition exists in the equipment market." Id. at 2081 n.10.
36. Image Technical Servs., 903 F.2d at 616.
37. Id.; cf. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] rational consumer
considering the purchase of Kodak equipment will inevitably factor into his purchasing
decision the expected cost of aftermarket support.").
[Vol. 73
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been to sacrifice sales in the equipment market.3" In effect, Kodak
argued that the tie, which the ISOs alleged forced the purchase of
service as a condition of buying parts, could succeed only if it were the
customers' desire for Kodak equipment, not parts, that made them
purchase Kodak service.39 Given its undisputed lack of power in the
equipment market,' Kodak concluded that a tie based on that market
could not be an antitrust violation.41
The Supreme Court, however, was unwilling to treat the equip-
ment, parts, and service markets as so tightly linked. The issue of the
interaction among the markets, as the Supreme Court framed it, was
"whether a defendant's lack of market power in the primary equip-
ment market precludes-as a matter of law-the possibility of market
power in derivative [parts and service] aftermarkets."42 Although the
Court suggested that Kodak's argument might have been inadequate
even if the factual claims on which it was based were true,43 it devoted
most of its attention to an analysis of the factual circumstances that
could render the argument inaccurate. The Court focused on two ef-
fects that might have weakened the link between the equipment mar-
ket and the parts and service aftermarkets. First, Kodak's equipment
customers might not have had sufficient information to assess the
costs of aftermarket parts and service, so that those costs might not
have been reflected fully in their decisions to purchase the equip-
ment.44 Second, customers who already owned Kodak equipment
38. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2081-82; Image Technical Servs., 903 F.2d at 616.
39. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087 (interpreting Kodak's claim as one that equipment
and service were "pure complements"); see also infra text accompanying notes 61-65.
40. See supra note 35.
41. Proof of market power is an element of a claim that a tie is an antitrust violation.
See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984) ("[W]e have con-
demned tying arrangements when the seller has some special ability-usually called 'mar-
ket power'-to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive
market."); see also supra text accompanying note 31 (describing the nature of an illegal
tie).
42. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2076.
43. The Court pointed out that Kodak's claim that consumers considered the price of
parts and service when buying equipment was not decisive:
Kodak's claim that charging more for service and parts would be "a short-run
game" is based on the false dichotomy that there are only two prices that can be
charged-a competitive price or a ruinous one. But there could easily be a mid-
dle, optimum price at which the increased revenues from the higher-priced sales
of service and parts would more than compensate for the lower revenues from
lost equipment sales. The fact that the equipment market imposes a restraint on
prices in the aftermarkets by no means disproves the existence of power in those
markets.
Id. at 2084 (citation to Kodak's brief omitted).
44. Id. at 2085-87; see also infra part II.A.
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might have found it prohibitively expensive to switch to another brand
due to their investments in the equipment.45 The Court referred to
these two obstacles to equipment market responsiveness as informa-
tion costs and switching costs, respectively, and stated that "there is a
question of fact whether information costs and switching costs foil the
simple assumption that the equipment and service markets act as pure
complements to one another. ' 46 The existence of this question of fact
precluded summary judgment, and the Court affirmed the Ninth Cir-
cuit's remand of the case for trial.47
Critics of Kodak do not generally contest the Court's acceptance
of the possibility of information and switching costs. Instead, they ar-
gue that such costs are unavoidable factors present in any similar mar-
ket4s and that they are not proper subjects of antitrust concern.49
Justice Scalia's Kodak dissent typifies these criticisms. Justice Scalia
observed that information costs "pervade real-world markets," 50 and
stated correctly that the Court had never before found such informa-
tion costs sufficient to establish market power for antitrust purposes;
indeed, the Court had rejected a similar argument in an earlier case.51
With respect to switching costs, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the
majority's view that such costs would enable Kodak to raise
45. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087; see also infra part II.B.
46. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087. Two products are complements if the purchase of one
makes the purchase of the second more likely. E.g., THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN
ECONoMics 74 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 1986).
47. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2092.
48. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services,
Inc.-Information Failure as Soul or Hook?, 62 ANrrrrnusT L.J. 759, 766 (1994) ("Small
information failures or lags are garden variety disorders of economic life."); Jacobs, supra
note 3, at 365 ("Kodak's rationale suggests that in any competitive market-not just those
for complex goods-substantial information gaps of many kinds can prevent consumers
from making rational decisions .... ).
49. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 48, at 766 (arguing that if such claims were allowed, "[t]he
law would lose its carefully honed limits"); Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 1448 ("The reali-
ties of ... obviously imperfect competition in markets for technically complex durable
goods have led some courts to conclude that a firm can quite readily be a 'monopolist' in
its own branded product or aftermarket services. But such holdings seem quite wrong as a
general policy matter .... (footnote omitted)).
50. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2097-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cites the following passage
from Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984):
The Court of Appeals ... recognized that ... a lack of adequate information
renders consumers unable to evaluate the quality of the medical care provided by
competing hospitals. While these factors may generate "market power" in some
abstract sense, they do not generate the kind of market power that justifies con-
demnation of tying.
Id. at 27 (citation and footnotes omitted). These comments from Jefferson Parish, and the
reasons why they do not apply to Kodak, are discussed below. See infra part IV.B.1.
ANTITRUST
aftermarket prices "is necessarily true for 'every maker of unique
parts for its own product.' "52 He contended, however, that the power
to raise prices in this manner was a result simply of the prior consumer
investment in the product, and was not a result of market power in the
antitrust sense.53
The majority and the dissent were both partly right. The major-
ity's claim that information and switching costs have market-power
implications is correct, but Justice Scalia's dismissal of each cost alone
as a source of market power is also valid. This Article argues that the
combination of both information and switching costs creates market
power. A tie, such as Kodak's, that imposes information costs in a
market where buyers' purchases expose them to switching costs can
subject those buyers to above-market prices-that is, it can provide
the seller with market power.54 The manner in which information and
switching costs might have interacted in this way in Kodak is discussed
below.
A. Information Costs
The role played by information costs in Kodak was relatively
straightforward. A potential purchaser of Kodak equipment seeking
to determine the long-term costs of owning, operating, and maintain-
ing that equipment would have required a great deal of difficult-to-
obtain information. As the Court stated,
52. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2098 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting ARmEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 4, 525.1(b) (Supp. 1991).
53. Id. at 2098 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia did not explain this point further.
See infra part V.C.1.
54. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REv. 937, 937 (1981) ("The term 'market power' refers to the ability of a firm (or
a group of firms, acting jointly) to raise price above the competitive level without losing so
many sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded."); see
also George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRusT L.J. 807, 808 (1992) ("It has
become traditional to think of the ability of a firm or group of firms to maintain prices
above the competitive level, although the meaning of 'price' can easily be expanded to take
into account other forms of consumer injury such as inferior quality.").
In tying cases, market power is sometimes defined somewhat differently. For instance,
in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), the Court defined it as the
ability "to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive mar-
ket," id. at 14, and, more specifically, "to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied prod-
uct that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere
on different terms," id. at 12. The Court made clear, however, that tying market power is
also the power to raise price, referring to the alternatives of "exploitation of market power
by merely enhancing the price of the tying product, on the one hand, and by attempting to
impose restraints on competition in the market for a tied product, on the other." Id. at 14;
see also supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (describing the ISOs' claim that owners
of Kodak equipment were "forced" to purchase service from Kodak).
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[t]he necessary information would [have] include[d] data on
price, quality, and availability of products needed to operate,
upgrade, or enhance the initial equipment, as well as service
and repair costs, including estimates of breakdown fre-
quency, nature of repairs, price of service and parts, length of
"down-time" and losses incurred from down-time. 55
Some of this information would have been unavailable at any cost,
and acquisition of even the available information would have required
the expenditure of considerable effort and expense.5 6 It is that ex-
pense that constituted a Kodak equipment buyer's information cost.
The Court's treatment of the legal significance of the information
costs in Kodak responded specifically to the parties' arguments. Re-
call that Kodak's contention was that it could not impose onerous
terms for service of its equipment because to do so would cause con-
sumers not to buy its equipment.5 7 The Supreme Court's response
was that information costs could prevent such a consumer reaction:
"For the service-market price to affect equipment demand, consumers
must inform themselves of the total cost of the 'package'-equipment,
service and parts-at the time of purchase; that is, consumers must
engage in accurate lifecycle pricing."5" Because there was a factual
question as to whether buyers could accomplish such lifecycle pric-
ing,59 the Court rejected Kodak's argument that "lack of power in the
equipment market necessarily precludes power in the aftermarkets." 60
Although the Court's view is accurate in a sense, a step back from
the specific arguments and admissions of Kodak6' reveals a simpler,
more useful interpretation of information costs. The tie of Kodak ser-
vice to Kodak parts, and the need for Kodak parts to operate Kodak
equipment, meant that the purchasing decisions for these three com-
ponents were not independent. Instead, the buyer of Kodak equip-
ment actually bought a package of Kodak equipment, parts, and
service.62 Therefore, the buyer's uncertainty regarding the equip-
55. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 2086 ("Much of this [lifecycle pricing] information is difficult-some of it
impossible-to acquire at the time of purchase.").
57. See supra text accompanying notes 33-41.
58. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
60. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2083.
61. As discussed above, the Court was responding specifically to Kodak's argument
claiming that parts and service price increases would cause lost sales in the equipment
market, see supra text accompanying note 57, and it was doing so in the context of the
ISOs' admission in the court of appeals that Kodak had no power in the equipment market,
see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
62. See supra text accompanying note 58; see also Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The record below is consistent-in large part-with just this sort of bundling
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ment's future parts and service costs was uncertainty regarding the
overall cost of the equipment-and-parts-and-service product. The
product was in this view similar to any other product-such as, for
example, a variable-rate mortgage6 3-for which only part of the cost is
known at the time of purchase. It is a well-accepted proposition that
when there is this sort of uncertainty regarding the cost of a product,
the seller of that product has market power. The economic literature
on this subject is discussed in Part III of this Article, but for now it is
sufficient to offer the intuitive notion that when there is uncertainty
regarding a product's cost, consumers will be less responsive to an in-
crease (or, for that matter, a decrease) in the cost, so that sellers of the
product will have the power to raise its price-the usual definition of
market power.64 This definition is borne out by the Court's statement
that information costs "could create a less responsive connection be-
tween service and parts prices and equipment sales."' 65 Because parts
and service were simply components of the overall equipment pack-
age, the Court's statement implied that increases in the price of the
package did not lead to corresponding decreases in its sales.
Another way to look at the information-cost issue is to consider
whether uncertainty regarding the cost of Kodak equipment "co-
erced" the buyer to accept a tie, as is required to find an illegal tie.66
As Justice Scalia stated, if the product is equipment-and-parts-and-
service, the proper inquiry is "whether Kodak's market power in the
equipment market effectively forced consumers to purchase Kodak
... machines subject to the company's restrictive aftermarket prac-
tices."'67 In fact, uncertainty can create market power that has just
of equipment on the one hand, with parts and service on the other."). In a sense, it might
be more accurate to treat the purchase as one of equipment and an obligation/requirement
to purchase parts and service. This perspective would make more clear that the purchase
price the buyer pays for the equipment does not include the prices for parts and service (in
the absence of a service agreement), but that the buyer incurs a liability for future costs of
parts and service.
63. A variable-rate mortgage, however, does not present an information-based mar-
ket-power problem because the costs of switching to an alternative mortgage (probably
just the closing costs on the new mortgage) are low relative to the overall cost of the
original mortgage. See generally infra text accompanying notes 120-23 (switching costs
limit market power); text accompanying note 159 (switching-cost market power threshold
requirement); see also infra part V.B (discussing other circumstances in which switching
costs are absent).
64. See supra note 54 and accompanying text; infra notes 134-36 and accompanying
text.
65. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085.
66. See supra notes 32, 54.
67. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice
Scalia refers only to equipment, rather than to the equipment-and-parts-and-service pack-
age, but if the relevant product is the entire package, power over that entire package must
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such an effect. Only if all of the information regarding equipment,
parts, and service costs was readily and cheaply available could a Ko-
dak equipment buyer willingly have accepted the tie. That is so be-
cause only then would the customer have been aware, at the time of
her equipment purchase, of the costs that Kodak's policy would im-
pose on her.68 A customer who accepted the policy in those circum-
stances would therefore have done so willingly (in the sense that she
knowingly would have accepted Kodak's equipment-and-parts-and-
service package rather than that of another manufacturer),6 9 and the
necessary coercive element of a tie would have been absent.70 But if
the customer were unaware of the full extent of her future costs at the
time she made the purchase, her later payment of those costs could be
unwilling, or "coerced," if she were not later free to switch to an alter-
native brand of equipment. The buyer's inability to switch is essential,
though; the coercion would have depended upon the existence of
switching costs, as discussed in the next section.
be considered. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 1456-57 (using overall equipment costs
over life of equipment as basis for market power test).
68. The uncertainty could also be reduced if service providers took on the risk of the
uncertainty. For example, if service providers all sold lifetime service contracts, and a
buyer chose that option, there would be no uncertainty, at least as to the price of parts and
service. See Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Dis-
closure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461,470-77 (1981); Michael Spence, Con-
sumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STuD. 561,
569-71 (1977). Uncertainty would still remain, however, regarding such items as the fre-
quency with which repair would be necessary and how long the service provider would
take to respond and effect necessary repairs.
69. One must be careful in concluding that a tie is willingly accepted, however. I be-
lieve that Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp err in this respect in their latest antitrust
treatise supplement. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1709.2 (discussing Ko-
dak). Their discussion focuses on franchise agreements, which are discussed infra in the
text accompanying notes 278-86. They say that a franchisee who is required by her
franchisor to accept high prices for franchise supplies as part of a contract to renew the
franchise is subject to the coercive power of the switching costs that she would lose if she
abandoned the franchise. Id. 1709.2(c)(2)(C). But Areeda and Hovenkamp distinguish
that situation from one in which a franchisee who initially agreed to buy supplies from the
franchisor is later confronted with a considerable increase in the prices for those supplies.
Id. 1709.2c2(B). In the latter case, Areeda and Hovenkamp say, the franchisee would be
aware of the potential of the price increases at the time she entered into the initial con-
tract, so the increases would provide no coercive power. Id. This distinction is untenable.
In the first example, where it was the terms of the renewal contract that were burdensome,
the franchisee knew at the time of entering into the first contract that renewal might re-
quire different terms, just as in the second example the franchisee knew that prices might
be increased. In both circumstances, the franchisee would be subject to the coercive power
of switching costs-though, as argued infra part V.C.1, I do not think that either of these
situations presents a market information problem similar to the one in Kodak.
70. Recall that Kodak, in the absence of information costs, did not have market power
in the equipment market, see supra note 35 and accompanying text, so that the customer's




Switching costs were described in Kodak as the investments that a
buyer sacrifices in switching from one product to another.7 ' In Kodak,
these costs included both the portion of the initial investment in
equipment that could not be recovered and ancillary expenses such as
training and documentation.72 Switching costs are not unusual; as Jus-
tice Scalia pointed out, every purchaser of a product that requires
some capital investment incurs them.73 Whenever such a product still
has useful life, that remaining life will have value that will be costly to
sacrifice in switching to a different product. Only when the entire
value of the product has been consumed, or in those rare circum-
stances in which its resale value fully reflects its value to its owner, will
the cost of switching from it be zero.
The majority in Kodak stated that a buyer who had invested in an
expensive durable good, and had thereby assumed the burden of
switching costs in the event of a change to an alternative product,
would "tolerate some level of service-price increases before changing
equipment brands."'74 The dissent did not disagree with this charac-
terization of the effects of switching costs, but it did not find them of
antitrust significance.75 Justice Scalia listed a number of circum-
stances in which such switching costs arise, and stated that "[leverage,
in the form of circumstantial power, plays a role in each of these rela-
tionships; but in none of them is the leverage attributable to the domi-
nant party's market power in any relevant sense. '76 He did not,
however, offer any means of distinguishing "circumstantial" power
from market power. The distinction derives from a buyer's knowing
and willing acceptance of a locked-in position. 77
If at the time of a buyer's original purchase she is, or should be,
aware of the switching costs that she would incur to change products,
71. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087 (using "switching costs" to refer to "the costs to
current owners of switching to a different product").
72. See id. (referring to evidence that "the heavy initial outlay for Kodak equipment,
combined with the required support material that works only with Kodak equipment,
makes switching costs very high for existing Kodak customers").
73. Id. at 2098-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing a variety of products and circum-
stances in which a buyer would incur costs to switch to an alternative). For a discussion of
Justice Scalia's examples, see infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
74. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087.
75. Id. at 2098-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2098 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's "circumstantial" power is de-
scribed infra part V.C.1.
77. Because in Justice Scalia's examples such knowing acceptance of lock-in was pres-
ent, but in Kodak was not, the distinction drawn here renders his point inapplicable to
Kodak. See infra part V.C.1.
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she presumably accepts the possibility of those switching costs as a
part of the sale.78 To make this apparent, consider the buyer's deci-
sion-making process in deciding whether, and on what terms, to
purchase an expensive durable good. The buyer, if she chose, could
bargain for the privilege of returning the product at a given time for
its unused value to her. 9 The buyer would then incur no switching
costs if she later decided to change to a different product.80 This is not
an implausible scenario; it basically describes a leasing or rental ar-
rangement. If a knowing buyer chooses not to bargain for such an
arrangement, and instead chooses to make the purchase and incur
switching costs, she makes that choice not as a result of any market
power of the seller, but as a result of her preference for other terms
that she perceives as more valuable. 81
78. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085-86 n.20 (noting that a consumer pricing equipment
would need "residual value information such as the longevity of product use and its poten-
tial resale or trade-in value").
79. Professor Klein has suggested that contractual protections could also be used to
eliminate or reduce information cost problems. See Klein, supra note 4, at 51. But the
difficulty with information costs is that, in some cases, neither the buyer nor the seller has
the relevant information, so that neither can contract for those costs. See id. at 49 ("Even
Kodak does not know at the time it sells equipment what it will be charging for parts and
aftermarket services over the complete life of the equipment."); see also id. at 51 ("Fixing
aftermarket prices far in advance may be difficult because one does not know what
changes in technology and relative prices will occur over time."). Professor Klein suggests
that this problem could be avoided by using a "most favored purchaser" clause, whereby
long-time owners of equipment could be charged no more than recent purchasers of the
equipment. Id. However, that is at best only a partial solution to the problem, because the
difficulty is as likely to be unexpected differences between the manufacturer and its com-
petitors as between the manufacturer's treatment of old and new customers. See infra part
IV.A.
80. The buyer may also have incurred additional costs, such as the cost of training its
personnel to use the new product. Those costs are typically not part of the product's
purchase price, but they are (or should be) known at the time of purchase, so they are also
costs that the buyer accepts, and he could bargain for their reimbursement.
A similar analysis applies to the exploitation of a buyer "locked-in" by unexpected
increases in aftermarket prices. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087; Richard Craswell, Tying
Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV.
661, 674-75 (1982). At the time of the original equipment purchase, the buyer knows that
she will be limited in her choice of aftermarket products. That is so because any later
purchase of products or services to be used with the equipment must be compatible with it
(so that even where the aftermarket products are available from more than one manufac-
turer, there will still be a limited number of sources from which to choose). Therefore, the
buyer is aware that there will be an opportunity for the aftermarket producers to raise
prices. She could therefore bargain with the original equipment seller to provide those
products at a specified price, or to later compensate her for any higher price that she might
have to pay. Cf supra note 69 (discussing Areeda and Hovenkamp's view of analogous
problems in franchise agreements).
81. Of course, the buyer could be forced to accept an undesired purchase arrange-
ment, including switching costs, as a result of market power of the seller. But that market
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This description approximates Justice Scalia's view of switching
costs. As he wrote, because switching costs are incurred at the time of
the initial equipment purchase, the Kodak majority's treatment of
such costs as coercive "essentially repudiat[es]" the majority's as-
sumption of "Kodak's lack of any power whatsoever in the interbrand
market."' 2 But whatever force Justice Scalia's criticism may have
when applied to the majority opinion, it has none when applied to the
analysis in this Article, because the present analysis explicitly repudi-
ates the assumption that Kodak lacked interbrand market power. The
analysis here does not thereby agree with Justice Scalia's views,
though, because it also rejects the assumption on which his view of
switching costs rests-that the buyer's knowing acceptance of the
switching costs necessarily implies that those costs can have no coer-
cive effect.
Consider again the facts of Kodak. Assume that a buyer
purchases a piece of Kodak equipment with knowledge both of the
costs of later switching to another brand of equipment and of a re-
quirement that she use Kodak service. Assume further that the qual-
ity of service received from Kodak is much lower than expected. The
buyer may then desire to switch from her Kodak equipment to some
other brand, but be forced to remain with Kodak because of the high
cost of switching. In this scenario, the coercive effect arises not from
the switching costs-those were, as Justice Scalia says, known and ac-
cepted at the time of the initial purchase-but from the unexpectedly
low service quality, of which the buyer was unaware because of infor-
mation costs.83
power would have to derive from some other source, not from the switching costs. In those
circumstances, the switching costs would-be a result of the market power, not a source of it.
82. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2098 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority's view, as described
supra in the text accompanying note 45, was that "a seller profitably could maintain
supracompetitive prices in the aftermarket if the switching costs were high relative to the
increase in service prices, and the number of locked-in customers were high relative to the
number of new purchasers." Id. at 2087. Justice Scalia's objection is that the majority's
"supracompetitive prices in the aftermarket" imply a "total 'system' price above competi-
tive levels in the interbrand market," id. at 2098 (Scalia, J., dissenting), which could only be
maintained if Kodak had market power. See supra note 54 (stating that market power is
the ability to maintain supracompetitive prices). As discussed in the text, however, this
analysis ignores the possibility that information costs could make the buyer unaware of the
total system price until after her purchase had locked her into that price.
83. This analysis is analogous to that presented in recent work on the antitrust implica-
tions of penalties in long-term contracts. See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts
as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 388 (1987); Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert
Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REv.
1161 (1993). Brodley and Ma examine the effects of terms in contracts between suppliers
and customers under which the customers are required to make payments to their original
suppliers if they decide to switch to different ones. The payment penalties are shown to be
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The switching costs in this scenario, rather than worsening the
buyer's situation, actually represent the upper limit on the buyer's
possible losses from unexpectedly poor service quality. No matter
how much information the buyer lacks, no matter how much more
costly is her purchase than expected, she can switch to an alternative
product at any time, capping her future losses at the amount of her
switching costs at that time.' The ultimate example of this principle
is seen where switching costs are zero: Although information costs
may exist, a buyer can costlessly switch to another product at any time
to avoid suffering further from those costs." In Kodak, of course,
neither information nor switching costs were zero, so the buyers were
subject to the market effects of those costs. The next part provides the
background needed to evaluate those effects.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION
"[K]nowledge is power," as a seminal article on the economics of
information emphatically restated.8 6 In the case of market power, it is
also accurate to say that a buyer's lack of knowledge is the seller's
power. The economic literature shows that a lack of price or quality
information in a market allows sellers to raise prices above the com-
barriers to entry because they require new entrants to offer prices even lower than the
competitive level to compensate customers for the switching penalties. Id. at 1167-72.
However, in return for the customers' acceptance of terms that restrict the entry of new,
lower-cost suppliers, the customers receive lower prices from their original suppliers. See
id. at 1164.
The parallel to the present case is almost exact. Kodak's ties placed its equipment
owners in a position from which they would have had to sacrifice switching costs to change
to a different brand of equipment; those switching costs would have acted as a penalty. But
Kodak's arrangement, as the penalty analysis suggests, may also have compensated buyers
for their sacrifice of possible future gains by switching. The Court noted that Kodak itself
said that "[a] pricing strategy based on lower equipment prices and higher aftermarket
prices could enhance equipment sales" (though Kodak did not claim that it had actually
adopted such a strategy). 112 S. Ct. at 2088 & n.26. Kodak's claim was that such a strategy
could make it easier for a buyer to finance the initial equipment purchase, id. at 2088, but
the contract-penalty analysis provides an alternative, less innocuous interpretation. Impor-
tantly, the penalty analysis, like the switching-cost analysis presented here, concludes that
an antitrust problem is presented only in the presence of uncertainty: "[The original sup-
plier's] bargaining strategy will succeed ... only if entry is uncertain at the time the penalty
contract is signed." Brodley & Ma, supra, at 1167.
84. Cf Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 71 (1973) ("In case of complete ignorance on the part of the
consumer, the amount of fraud is limited only by the price differential between a new unit
and the present one.").
85. This statement applies only to future information costs, because costs already in-
curred cannot be recovered.
86. George J. Stigler, The Economics ofInformation, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213,213 (1961).
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petitive level.87 That is so even if the seller, as well as the buyer, lacks
the information.88 The Supreme Court in Kodak cited some of the
literature on the economics of information in support of its argument
that information costs could have enabled Kodak to raise prices in the
parts and service markets.89 However, the Court cited this material
only to refute Kodak's argument that exploitation of the parts and
service markets would be prevented by the possibility of lost sales in
the equipment market.90 As described above,91 the role of market in-
formation is more fundamental. Uncertainty with regard to either the
overall price or quality of a product9' can create market power ex-
ploitable by the seller of that product.93
A. Search Costs
The Kodak Court referred to economics literature to support its
discussion of the difficulty, or expense, of determining the true price
87. The usual definition of market power is the ability to raise prices above the com-
petitive level. See supra note 54.
88. Indeed, it may be true only if the buyers at least believe that the seller lacks the
relevant information. See infra note 100.
89. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085 n.19 (citing Craswell, supra note 80; Howard Beales
et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981)); see
also Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087 n.22 (citing Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and
Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REv. ECON. STUD.
493 (1977); Steve Salop, Information and Monopolistic Competition, 66 AM. ECON. REv.:
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERI-
CAN ECONOMIC AssoCIATrON 240 (1976); Stigler, supra note 86, at 213).
90. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085-87.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 61-70.
92. Although the discussion below often refers only to price or quality, both character-
istics generally can provide market power in much the same manner. One commentator
notes that
[a] consumer with less information (higher search costs) is also less aware of the
existence of good substitutes for the noisy monopolist's product; thus, he would
be illing to pay a higher price, ceteris paribus. For example, of two consumers
who value nicotine equally, the one who is unaware that cigars also supply nico-
tine will be willing to pay more for cigarettes. It is in this manner that quality and
price information gathering may be linked.
Steven Salop, The Noisy Monopolist Imperfect Information, Price Dispersion and Price
Discrimination, 44 REv. ECON. STUD. 393, 403 (1977).
93. A warning is appropriate here: "[T]he reader is cautioned that information eco-
nomics is perhaps the most confusing branch of the dismal science. Because the demand
for information is derived from the demand for products, failures in one market feed back
on the other in a circular fashion." Beales et al., supra note 89, at 503. The circular nature
of informational market effects makes exposition of those effects difficult. At times, there-
fore, the discussion below may seem to gloss over some of the information-product interac-
tions, but those gaps should be filled in when these issues are discussed in the more
concrete context of Kodak in part IV.A, infra.
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that will be paid for a product.94 The capacity of price uncertainty to
create market power can be seen intuitively by considering a con-
sumer attempting to decide whether she should purchase a given
product. The consumer is more likely, all other things being equal, to
make that purchase if she would have to incur additional costs to de-
termine the prices of alternative products. It will only be worth her
while to seek out a lower price if the cost of doing so is less than the
savings that she expects to receive. Therefore, even when the price
charged by a seller is higher than other prices in the market, if the
price difference is sufficiently low in comparison with information
costs in that market, the seller will be able to maintain the higher
price.
This phenomenon was examined formally in an article by George
Stigler, cited by the Court in Kodak.95 Stigler concluded that a
buyer's expected gain from a search for a lower price is equal to the
quantity of the item that the buyer plans to purchase multiplied by the
expected reduction in price as a result of the search.96 The buyer
should conduct the search if this expected gain is less than the cost of
the search.97 Although this analysis is enlightening, its practical value
is lessened by its reliance on an assumption that the buyer, in deciding
whether to search, already knows how much she can expect to save by
the search. That is, the analysis assumes that the buyer knows the
price distribution for the products that she is considering. A buyer
seldom has such knowledge.9" Stigler's model nevertheless has an im-
94. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085 (discussing need for accurate lifecycle pricing); see
also id. at 2087 (discussing possibility of price discrimination among buyers with different
abilities to perform lifecycle pricing).
95. Stigler, supra note 86 (cited in Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087 n.22).
96. Id. at 215.
97. Id. at 216.
98. One of the more "economic" articles in the legal literature attempts to remedy this
failing of the Stigler analysis. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets
on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv.
630 (1979) [hereinafter Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets]; Louis L. Wilde & Alan
Schwartz, Equilibrium Comparison Shopping, 46 Rv. ECON. STUD. 543 (1979). In Inter-
vening in Markets, Schwartz and Wilde use a model similar to the ones advanced in the
economic literature, but adopt "more plausible assumptions with respect to how consumers
search and what they know about the prices they face." Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in
Markets, supra, at 646. They assume that there are two groups of consumers: those who
visit one store and those who visit more than one store. Id. at 648, 650. They also assume,
however, that consumers will visit more stores if their potential gains (typically in price)
are greater. Id. at 648. Although this assumption is no doubt plausible as a general matter,
it assumes that consumers have at least some information regarding the price distribution,
which is the very assumption that the authors sought to avoid. In a more recent article, the
same authors no longer make this assumption and instead rely on intuitive justifications for
the consumer shopping strategies their model uses. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
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portant implication in the present context. Because his analysis con-
cludes that, at equilibrium, buyers' potential savings are proportional
to their search costs, it implies that prices will be widely dispersed
when search costs are high. Practically, this is a result of the fact that
when search costs are high, sellers have little reason to price near their
competition.99 At the limit, if it were impossible for buyers to deter-
mine costs-that is, if search costs were infinite-there would also be
no limit on price dispersion.
This problem of price dispersion as a result of high search costs is
subject to manipulation by the seller. To the extent that the seller can
define its product in such a way as to make it more difficult for con-
sumers to determine its cost, the seller can create this type of market
imperfection. 1°° Kodak's tie of service to parts and equipment, I ar-
Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Se-
curity Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1404-05 (1983) [hereinafter Schwartz & Wilde, Imper-
fect Contract Information]; see also infra note 102.
99. Stigler, supra note 86, at 220 ("Buyers accordingly cannot make the amount of
investment in search that perfect correlation of prices would justify. The greater the insta-
bility of supply and/or demand conditions, therefore, the greater the dispersion of prices
will be."). Moreover, price dispersion can be high not just among different sellers, but
among different buyers from the same seller. If consumers have differing information
costs, and if those with higher costs are willing to pay higher prices, then a seller can profit-
ably sell at a higher price to those high-information-cost buyers. See Salop, supra note 92,
at 403. For example, Kodak claimed that some large-volume buyers would have sufficient
incentive to search out Kodak's price information. 112 S. Ct. at 2086-87.
100. Conversely, a seller who reduces search costs can reduce price dispersion. As Stig-
ler points out, advertising can effectively provide information that would otherwise require
a large amount of buyer search. Stigler, supra note 86, at 224 ("The effect of advertising
prices, then, is equivalent to that of the introduction of a very large amount of search by a
large portion of the potential buyers."). Kodak claimed that this would be an effective
source of information in its case because its competitors would provide information to
buyers. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2086. However, there are at least two reasons why this might
not have been the case. First, even if competing sellers could have provided needed infor-
mation to buyers, they could have done so only at a cost to themselves. Providing the
information would have been a cost for a competing seller, which would have raised its
price, so the market power of Kodak would not have been eliminated, only lessened. See
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs To Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.L 209,268-72 (1986). More fundamentally,
though, a seller can only provide information it knows. Although Kodak's (non-tying)
competitors could have provided some information regarding their own equipment, parts,
and service prices, they, no less than buyers, would have found it difficult to determine
Kodak's long-term service costs. Therefore, they would not have had the information that
buyers needed. Cf. Stigler, supra note 86, at 219 ("One source of dispersion is simply the
cost to dealers of ascertaining rivals' asking prices ....").
The inability of sellers themselves to obtain information is important in another re-
spect. George Akerlof has shown that when a seller is known to have quality information
and does not provide it to buyers, those buyers will rationally assume that the quality of
the seller's goods is the lowest possible. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons"
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970). At the
limit, buyers may be completely unwilling to buy a product. Id. at 491 (using used-car
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gue in this Article, was a definition of its product that had just such an
effect. 10 1 The tie forced buyers considering Kodak equipment to elect
one of the following alternatives: (1) incur the expense of estimating
the costs of Kodak service (if possible) and comparing them with al-
ternatives, or (2) purchase Kodak equipment, or some other brands,
with incomplete information regarding service costs, thereby saving
the costs of the search but subjecting the buyers to uncertain-per-
haps supracompetitive-costs.'02 The higher the costs of searching,
market as example). Sellers are therefore motivated to provide information regarding the
quality of their products, if they have such information and can communicate it cost-effec-
tively. See generally Grossman, supra note 68 (discussing role of warranties of product
quality). See also infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
In real markets, of course, the quality information available to a seller will fall some-
where between perfect information and no information. The economic literature has as yet
had little to say about these intermediate conditions, where the seller's incentives are un-
clear. One article has suggested that where consumers' information costs are high, sellers
will themselves provide less information, even if they could do so at a cost lower than that
at which buyers could acquire the information. Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the
Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & ECON. 27, 30 (1982). The Supreme Court alluded to a
similar phenomenon in Kodak, responding to Kodak's argument that its competitors would
remedy any information deficiencies by observing that it could be in all the sellers' inter-
ests to withhold information. 112 S. Ct. at 2086 & n.21. Kodak's reference was to competi-
tors' unwillingness to search out and provide lifecycle cost information, but the principle
applies in the same way to quality information.
101. Moreover, the potential for this sort of effect is exacerbated when the product is
one that is infrequently purchased, as was the case in Kodak. The buyer of an infrequently
purchased product cannot spread the search costs over several purchases, so the seller is
able to extract the full measure of the costs of search in each purchase. Stigler's result is
that equilibrium will occur when
ql I = cost of search,
where q is the quantity of the product to be purchased, p is the price to be paid, and n is
the number of searches. Stigler, supra note 86, at 215-16. Hence, price dispersion, which is
related to the change of price as a result of search, is a function of the costs of search
divided by the quantity of goods to be purchased.
Another perspective on this issue is provided in Phillip Nelson, Information and Con-
sumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970). Nelson shows that when the frequency of
purchase is low, fewer searches will be performed. Id. at 315 & Table 1. Stigler, in turn,
notes that the average minimum price when prices are uniformly distributed between 0 and
I is 11(n + 1), where n is the number of searches. Stigler, supra note 86, at 214-15; see also
Nelson, supra, at 318 ("[T]he larger the number of brands a consumer samples, the lower
the monopoly power for that good.").
102. Price dispersion is not necessarily high if at least some buyers comparison shop.
See Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Contract Information, supra note 98, at 1402-05.
Schwartz and Wilde assume that some buyers will comparison shop, but they do not at-
tempt to show that such comparison shopping is profitable for those buyers. See id. at
1402-04. Although their assumption might be borne out if buyers had heterogeneous ex-
pectations regarding the value of comparison shopping, so that some buyers expected
shopping to be valuable, see supra note 98, it could also be the case that no individual
buyer would profit from a search, so that no search would be performed. See also infra
note 154 (discussing different amounts of information available to buyers).
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the more likely the buyer is to choose the second of these alternatives,
which gives sellers, including Kodak, the power-market power-to
charge supracompetitive prices. In this way, information costs lead to
market power.10 3
B. Experience Costs
A buyer who elects not to, or cannot,1°4 search for information
regarding a product she purchases will, of course, acquire information
about the product after purchase. Phillip Nelson has drawn a distinc-
tion between search information acquired through investigation prior
to purchase and what he called experience information, which is ac-
quired through experience of the product after purchase. °5 Although
103. Stigler makes the following statements that are apparently inconsistent with those
in the text: "From the manufacturer's viewpoint, uncertainty concerning his price is clearly
disadvantageous. The cost of search is a cost of purchase, and consumption will therefore
be smaller, the greater the dispersion of prices and the greater the optimum amount of
search." Stigler, supra note 86, at 223. However, a reduction in output, far from disprov-
ing the existence of market power, is completely consistent with it. As long as the
supracompetitive price is sufficient to compensate the seller for his lower sales, he will
benefit. See supra note 54; see also Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2084 ("The sales of even a monop-
olist are reduced when it sells goods at a monopoly price, but the higher price more than
compensates for the loss in sales.").
104. Referring to various forms of quality information, the Supreme Court in Kodak
said that "[m]uch of this information is difficult-some of it impossible-to acquire at the
time of purchase." 112 S. Ct. at 2086.
105. Nelson, supra note 101, at 311-12. This Article discusses only search and experi-
ence information, but a third category of product information also has been proposed. See
Darby & Karni, supra note 84, at 69. Credence characteristics, Darby and Karni suggest,
are those whose value a buyer typically will not know, even after purchase. Darby &
Karni, supra note 84, at 69. The example that they use is service for durable goods. A
seller of such service, if he effects a satisfactory repair, can often provide additional but
useless services that can only be detected if the buyer chooses to expend resources to de-
tect them. Id. at 69-72. Darby and Karni distinguish credence characteristics from search
characteristics, which they define as "qualities which are known before purchase," and
experience characteristics, "qualities which are known costlessly only after purchase." Id.
at 69. However, it is misleading to say that experience is costless after purchase. See infra
text accompanying note 111. Although for some products it is inevitable, it is not costless.
To the extent that a product performs less well than expected, or less well than an alterna-
tive to that product, the buyer incurs costs during her use of the product.
Credence characteristics do not really impose costs different from those of search or
experience characteristics. Instead, credence costs share some of the characteristics of
both search and experience costs. Credence characteristics, like search characteristics, are
ones that a buyer may or may not choose to determine, but in any event must make an
intentional effort (i.e., incur costs) to discover. And credence characteristics, like experi-
ence characteristics, arise, if at all, from the mere fact of a buyer's purchase, so that the
buyer has no choice but to suffer the associated costs. Credence costs, then, are a combina-
tion of search and experience costs: they arise when a buyer must pay search costs to
determine what experience costs he has already suffered.
As one would expect, the same competitive problems arise from credence costs as
from search and experience costs. Darby and Karni point out that credence problems al-
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Nelson treats experience information as relating to products' quality
characteristics, price information can also be acquired through experi-
ence, as with long-term service costs in Kodak.106 Regardless of
whether price or quality is involved, though, information is typically
derived from experience rather than search only when experience is
the less expensive of the two. Sometimes that will be the case because
experience is relatively inexpensive, as with some consumer goods. 10 7
In other cases, though, experience will be used despite its considerable
expense because the cost of search is even higher. Goods like the
copiers and micrographic equipment at issue in Kodak are particularly
good examples. When a producer provides service over an extended
period, it is difficult to determine in advance, through search, the
value of those services. 108 In those circumstances, the only alternative
may be to rely on experience.
As Nelson describes it, a buying decision in which experience
costs are involved is made in much the same way as a decision in the
face of search costs. A consumer should continue to seek information
until her marginal cost exceeds her marginal revenue. 0 9 Marginal
revenue for experience characteristics, as for search characteristics, is
defined by the benefit expected in future purchases of the product as a
result of the additional information obtained.110 Marginal cost, how-
ever, is defined not by the costs of active search but by the loss occa-
sioned through use of the product as the buyer-user acquires
low a seller profitably to provide more service than the buyer truly needs. Darby & Karmi,
supra note 84, at 70-72. This is, however, really no different from price dispersion as a
result of pre-purchase search costs. Price dispersion would not be described as fraud, of
course, probably because a high-price seller may not (though also may) know of the extra
costs that she is imposing on her buyers. But Darby and Karni make clear that intent is not
a necessary part of their conception, either. Id. at 83. Credence costs can also share with
experience costs their long-term nature. Recalling the Kodak facts, a long-term contract to
use a particular service organization will impose credence costs if the organization provides
more service than desired through the life of the contract. See 112 S. Ct. at 2077. In light
of credence costs' lack of any unique characteristics, they will not be discussed further in
this Article.
106. The Court in Kodak listed a variety of information, including price information,
that was unavailable to equipment buyers at the time of purchase: "data on price, quality,
and availability of products needed to operate, upgrade, or enhance the initial equipment,
as well as service and repair costs, including estimates of breakdown frequency, nature of
repairs, price of service and parts, length of 'down-time' and losses incurred from down-
time." 112 S. Ct. at 2085. In contrast, the Court referred to "initial purchase information
such as prices, features, quality, and available warranties." Id. at 2085 n.20.
107. Nelson's example is canned tuna fish. Nelson, supra note 101, at 312.
108. Id
109. Id. at 314. For the analogous conclusion for search costs, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 95-97.
110. Nelson, supra note 101, at 313-14.
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experience regarding it."' This loss is not necessarily an absolute loss,
but is rather the amount by which the value of the actual product used
falls short of the highest-valued alternative product of which the buyer
is aware.
For some goods, and those discussed by Nelson fall into this cate-
gory, search and experience characteristics have as many similarities
as differences." 2 This is so when a product's useful life is not appreci-
ably longer than the period over which the buyer gains knowledge
about it. Information acquired through experience becomes useful
only when a new purchase is contemplated. If at that time the particu-
lar product through which experience was gained is of no value,'1 3 so
that the buyer need not sacrifice the current product in buying a new
one, it is of little import whether the information that the buyer pos-
sesses was obtained through active search or through prior use of simi-
lar products. In effect, the experience process can be thought of as a
search that requires purchase of the product.
The similarities of search costs and Nelson's experience costs can
be seen graphically in the following figures. Figure 1 shows the ac-
cumulation of search costs prior to purchase. The process is straight-
forward, with each effort by the buyer to obtain information regarding
his possible purchase adding an additional cost to the total:
SEARCH
.- ~-~ COST
1 2 3 4 5 PURCHASE
SEARCHES
Search Costs.
111. Id. at 314.
112. See Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 98, at 662 ("Markets for
some experience goods behave as if they were markets for search goods. .. ").
113. Recall that Nelson's example of an experience good was a can of tuna fish, see
supra note 107, which is obviously of no value after one has experienced it.
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Figure 2 shows the corresponding graph for experience costs. The ver-
tical dotted lines in this figure indicate the buyer's repeated purchases
of different brands"14 of the product in question. In the upper portion
of the figure, the solid line represents the utility of the particular prod-
uct the buyer is using at a given time, and the dotted line represents
the utility of the best product of which the buyer is aware, which will
typically be the best product that the buyer has thus far experienced.
When the utility of the current product is less than that of the best
product the buyer knows, the buyer is incurring Nelson's experience
costs, which are represented in Figure 2 by the hatched areas. The
lower portion of the figure then shows the integral (accumulated to-
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PURCHASES
Experience Costs.
Qualitatively, Figures 1 and 2 do not differ appreciably. After several
searches or experience with several brands of products, both search
costs and experience costs are sunk costs, and it is (or should be) un-
important to the buyer just how the costs were incurred. However,
experience costs do not always function in this way.
C. Experience Costs and Lock-In
The decision process described in the preceding paragraphs,
which can be referred to as the iterative experience process, is the one
114. The purchases actually could be of different brands of the same product, or of
somewhat different products. The important point is that they are different alternatives
that meet a need of the buyer more or less well.
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on which Nelson focuses." 5 However, the iterative process cannot be
applied to durable goods because it assumes that the buyer, after gain-
ing brief experience with one brand of a product, moves on to
purchase another. Experience costs are then, as Figure 2 showed, the
losses the buyer suffers through inadequate performance of a product
during the limited product lifetime over which the buyer uses it. With
durable goods, the experience process works differently. A buyer of a
durable good gains sufficient experience to determine the value of the
product within a period considerably shorter than the product's useful
life. Therefore, what Nelson calls "experience costs," the losses from
sub-par performance, continue long after the buyer has learned all she
ever learns about product quality. 16







TO  Td  Tf
Experience Costs with Lock-In.
The time scale for the figure extends from an initial time TO, the time
at which the product is purchased, to a final time Tf, the time at which
the useful life of the product ends. The actual value of the current
product and the value of a possible alternative are shown; both de-
115. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
116. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 112-13 (observing that Nelson assumes that the
product's useful life is no longer than the learning period).
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crease over time as the products depreciate.117 The difference be-
tween the value of the alternative product and the current one is
indicated by the hatching, and is, as in the iterative process, 1 8 the loss
suffered by the buyer as she continues to use the current product. The
total of this loss over time can be calculated to yield a total amount of
loss, the "experience cost," up to any given time t.119
Figure 3 also shows the significance of lock-in. Assume that at
time Td the buyer has ascertained the experience costs that she is suf-
fering, i.e., the buyer is no longer learning from her experience. 120
The learning period prior to Td is represented in Figure 3 by the up-
ward-sloping hatching; after Td, when the buyer is informed, the "ex-
perience"' 2' costs are indicated by downward-sloping hatching. As
noted above, the nature of a durable good is that time Tf, the prod-
uct's useful life, is typically much greater than time Td, the learning
period, as represented in Figure 3. After time Td, any further "experi-
ence costs" are of no value to the buyer, and she would prefer to
switch to the alternative product, which she knows performs better.122
Switching costs, however, determine whether a buyer can benefit
from her experience costs. In the absence of switching costs, the expe-
rience costs before time Td in Figure 3 would prompt the buyer to
switch so that she could avoid the costs after time Td. With switching
costs, though, the buyer will gain from switching only if, and to the
extent that, the experience costs that she would avoid from doing so
exceed her switching costs. Therefore, because experience costs rep-
117. Actually, because the buyer would probably purchase an alternative product when
it was new, the potential value of the alternative could be shown as a constant value (or
even as an increasing one if new, improved products were coming on the market). That
would not, however, change the form of the analysis.
118. See supra text accompanying note 111.
119. That is, the experience cost is
i (potential value (t) - current value (t)) dt.
TO
120. Of course, even at time Td, the buyer is unlikely to have perfect information re-
garding her available alternatives, for the same reasons that she did not have perfect infor-
mation about the product prior to the purchase. The buyer will nevertheless have acquired
some information about her alternatives. For example, in Kodak, equipment buyers
would, over the first months of ownership, have acquired information regarding their
equipment's reliability and service costs. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085-86 (1992).
121. "Experience" is put in quotation marks here because, though the buyer continues
to experience the costs, she is no longer learning from the experience. These "experience"
costs, therefore, differ from Nelson's experience costs. Cf. supra part III.B (describing
Nelson's view of experience costs).
122. Note that the buyer need not decide to switch immediately at time Td, the time at
which she acquires sufficient information to assess her alternatives; she could equally well
decide to switch later. However, at time Td the buyer's switching and (future) experience
costs will be at their greatest, so at that time that her savings would be greatest.
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resent the amount by which the performance of the buyer's product
falls short of its alternatives, switching costs represent the maximum
performance shortfall to which the buyer is locked in. That perform-
ance shortfall is the amount by which the seller of the product is able
to extract supracompetitive terms from the locked-in buyer."2
The preceding discussion provides a framework for determining
the antitrust market power of a seller over a locked-in buyer. Because
experience costs measure the degree by which the quality of the
buyer's product falls short of-or, equivalently, the amount by which
its price exceeds- 2 4-- the competitive level, the costs can be used to
determine the seller's market power. In this role, the "experience"
costs do not serve (as they do in Nelson's conception) to measure
costs that are more-or-less willingly incurred by buyers in obtaining
useful information,"2 but instead measure costs that, even after the
buyers have obtained relevant information, the buyers must unwill-
ingly pay to sellers. Whether these supracompetitive payments from
buyers to sellers are sufficient in particular cases to be of antitrust
concern is discussed in the next part, both in the specific context of
Kodak and more generally.
IV. INFORMATION-BASED MARKET POWER
This Article contends that tying market power can be produced
by buyers' difficulties in obtaining market information. As Part III
showed, this view is accepted by economists, but it seems not yet to
have been applied to Kodak.126 Even Professor Areeda did not take
123. The seller in such a situation is exploiting an actual locked-in buyer, but the analy-
sis applies more generally even to potential buyers. So long as the potential buyer is un-
able to obtain information through search at a cost lower than the experience costs of
Figure 3, she will be subject to the same power of the seller as is a buyer who has already
purchased the product. See infra part IV.A.
124. A product that performs one-half as well as an alternative at the same price, for
example, is equivalent to a product that performs at the same level for twice the price. See
Carl Shapiro & David J. Teece, Systems Competition and Aftermarkets: An Economic
Analysis of Kodak, 39 ANrurrRTsT BULL. 135, 146 n.22 (1994) ("In its purest form, life-cycle
costing boils down to a single output-oriented measure: for copiers, this measure would be
the cost per copy over the lifetime of the equipment, including equipment, parts, service,
suppliers, and the cost of operator time.").
125. In Nelson's view, experience costs, like search costs, are a buyer's means of acquir-
ing information about potential purchases. See supra part III.B. Although the buyer
would no doubt prefer to obtain such information at no cost, she will incur experience costs
willingly to the extent that she thereby realizes greater savings. See supra text accompany-
ing note 109.
126. Most treatments of Kodak have considered the case in the context of the ISOs'
admission in the court of appeals that Kodak did not have market power in the equipment
market. See, e.g., ArEEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 1709.2 ("The issue then is
whether the manufacturer has power over parts (the 'aftermarket') although he has none
1994]
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this approach in his antitrust treatise's recent discussion of Kodak, 27
despite having previously made a similar point in the treatise. 128 In
his earlier volume, Professor Areeda considered a primary market-
aftermarket tie like the one in Kodak, and said that such "a tie might
obscure the height of the tying product price from the defendant's
own customers."'1 29 His example was that of a manufacturer of an au-
tomobile that charged supracompetitive prices for its repair parts,130
thus forcing buyers of its cars to pay "a hidden premium on the car
itself' 13 1 and distorting consumers' purchasing decisions.'3 2 The argu-
ment in this Article proceeds from a recognition that each of the ef-
fects cited by Areeda-forcing buyers to pay a premium and
distorting their purchasing decisions-corresponds to an accepted def-
inition of antitrust market power.' 33 The first sections below describe
how such power could have been created in Kodak, applying the eco-
nomic analysis of Part III to the Kodak facts. The following sections
in the machine market (the 'primary market')."); Shapiro & Teece, supra note 124, at 137
("Our goal is to lay out the questions an economist must explore to determine whether a
firm facing equipment competition nonetheless has genuine market power in an
aftermarket."); see also supra note 35 (recounting the conclusion of the court of appeals
that Kodak lacked market power in the equipment market). Professor Lande, discussing
Kodak, has observed generally that information deficiencies, like market share, can create
market power, but he did not explore the question in any detail. See Robert H. Lande,
Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-
Kodak World, 62 ANrriusr L.. 193, 195 (1993) ("Imperfect information can be the
equivalent of traditional market share-based market power."). Professor Craswell antici-
pated many of the issues presented by Kodak in his insightful and often-cited 1982 article,
see Craswell, supra note 80, but he did not consider information costs as a source of market
power. See id. at 663 ("This Article ... departs from the traditional tie-in literature by
analyzing the conditions under which tie-ins are likely to be imposed by sellers without any
monopoly power.").
127. See AREDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1709.2.
128. See 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, AnTmusr LAW I 1712(f) (1991); see also infra text
accompanying notes 129-33.
129. AREEDA, supra note 128, 1712(f).
130. In Areeda's example, the buyers are not forced to buy the manufacturer's parts
directly, but are indirectly forced to do so by a requirement that the manufacturer's dealers
carry only those parts. Id. Areeda assumes that "most customers rely on these dealers for
repairs," id., so that the manufacturer effectively creates a tie. It is interesting to note that
there is no real forcing in this scenario, and that the arrangement has something of the
nature of a vertical restraint. In Kodak, in contrast, there was actual forcing. Kodak, 112 S.
Ct. at 2080 ("[R]espondents have presented sufficient evidence of a tie between service
and parts. The record indicates that Kodak would sell parts to third parties only if they
agreed not to buy service from ISOs."). Nevertheless, a vertical arrangement like that
described by Areeda presents analogous, but less competitively dangerous, informational
considerations. See infra part V.B.2.
131. AREEDA, supra note 128, 1712(f).
132. Id. ("Deceiving consumers and impairing their ability to make intelligent market
choices is anticompetitive and thus cannot justify [a tie].").
133. See supra note 54.
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then discuss some more general implications of information-based
market power.
A. Information-Based Market Power in Kodak
The discussion of Kodak here focuses on the effects of Kodak's
tie on potential purchasers of Kodak equipment. Some commenta-
tors,'134 and perhaps the Kodak opinion itself,135 treat information
costs as a problem only when an aftermarket tie is imposed after the
buyer's purchase of equipment. In fact, information costs present
competitive problems even when the tie is imposed prior to the initial
purchase. That is so because the tie, even when the buyer is aware of
it, amplifies the effects of the buyer's uncertainty by requiring long-
term purchases of the seller's aftermarket product, and thus increases
the seller's information-based market power. The buyer's pre-
purchase knowledge of a tie allows her only to anticipate those addi-
tional costs of the tie about which she knows prior to the purchase; it
does not reduce the effects of the information costs that prevented
134. See, e.g., Joseph Kattan, Market Power in the Presence of an Installed Base, 62
ANTrrRusT L.J. 1, 14 (1993) (indicating that the ability of a seller imposing a primary
market-aftermarket tie to charge a supracompetitive price in the aftermarket depends on
the presence of customers who are already locked in to the primary market); Shapiro &
Teece, supra note 124, at 149-51. Professors Shapiro and Teece are particularly explicit on
this point, stating that "there should be little or no concern about policy changes that are
announced in advance of equipment sales and anticipated by buyers." Id. at 149. They
reach this conclusion on the claim that "[w]ell-informed customers will pay no more than
the competitive price for [a] vendor's system, so long as competition exists in the primary
equipment market." Id. But the point of information costs is that customers are not "well-
informed," so that the markets (primary market and aftermarket) are not competitive.
Shapiro and Teece resist this point by arguing that the opportunity to reap supracompeti-
tive profits in the aftermarket will cause sellers to compete for customers' business in the
primary market: "So long as sellers anticipate aftermarket revenues and costs, consumers
will ultimately pay a competitive price for systems, even if they are not sophisticated or
well informed." Id. at 148. But this is incorrect. If the customers cannot accurately "antici-
pate aftermarket revenues and costs," the sellers' ability to do so (assuming it exists, see
supra notes 79, 90) is of little importance. That the sellers must compete with each other
for primary-market sales does not mean that the primary market will be competitive be-
cause the terms of competition will include customers' possibly erroneous expectations
regarding aftermarket costs. In the absence of collusion, sellers always compete for sales,
but market imperfections-including information costs-still lead to imperfect competi-
tion. Cf. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2086 & n.21 (noting that even if a seller's competitors have
information that the seller is pricing supracompetitively, the "competitors may find it more
profitable to adopt [the seller's] policy than to inform the consumers").
135. The Kodak majority rejected Justice Scalia's dissenting view that a parts-service tie
should be treated like an equipment-service tie, because, as the majority noted, there was a
lack of "evidence that [Kodak's] restrictive parts policy was ... generally known." 112 S.
Ct. at 2087 n.24 (quoting id. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted)).
Whether the majority would have found an equipment-service tie objectionable as an exer-
cise of market power is unclear.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
buyers of Kodak equipment from accurately determining lifecycle
prices.136 Hence, although locked-in buyers also face informational
problems (albeit less fundamental ones137), the following sections em-
phasize information-based market power in the Kodak equipment
market rather than in the aftermarkets. 138
1. Information Costs in Kodak
The effect of information costs in Kodak can be seen by assuming,
contrary to fact, that a Kodak equipment buyer could have entered
into one-year service contracts with service organizations. The
buyer's decision process would then have been much like Nelson's de-
scription of the iterative experience-goods process.139 The buyer
could have selected a service organization for the first year and then,
at the end of that year, decided whether to continue with that organi-
zation based on the service it provided. If, given the quality of service
the buyer received, the buyer expected an improvement from switch-
ing to another organization, 40 the buyer would have switched; this
process could have continued year-by-year until the buyer no longer
believed she stood to gain by switching.
By imposing the tie, though, Kodak locked the buyer into the
same service organization for the life of the equipment and prevented
her from learning from experience. Kodak's action precluded the
buyer from iteratively seeking improved service organizations, in
which case she would have suffered only Nelson's iterative experience
costs, and instead forced the buyer to: (1) stay with the original ser-
vice organization for the life of the equipment; or (2) sacrifice switch-
ing costs to change to another brand. The difference is that between
Figures 2 and 3. Whereas without the tie the buyer's information costs
could have been minimized by seeking out better service organiza-
136. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
137. The problems created by post-purchase exploitation of locked-in buyers are not
worsened by a tie like the one imposed by Kodak. See infra part V.C.1 (distinguishing
between post-purchase and pre-purchase information costs); infra part IV.A.1 (discussing
creation of market power by pre-purchase information costs). Moreover, at least in cases
in which the form of post-purchase exploitation can be anticipated, it can be protected
against by contract, a possibility not present when the parties are faced with pre-purchase
information costs. See supra note 79.
138. Cf supra note 126 (noting that most commentary on Kodak has focused on
aftermarket power).
139. See supra part III.B.
140. The buyer would have focused only on the benefits from switching, because the
costs of switching from one service organization to another would be minimal if the buyer
had only one-year service contracts. But see supra note 83 (observing that long-term con-
tracts that impose switching penalties can have antitrust implications).
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tions each year, as illustrated in Figure 2, with the tie the information
costs mounted steadily because the buyer was limited to Kodak ser-
vice, as indicated in Figure 3.
Figure 3, though useful in showing the nature of the experience-
cost problem faced by Kodak equipment owners, overlooks some
other considerations necessary to analyze the purchasing decision of
potential equipment buyers. For that purpose, Figure 4, an elabora-
tion of Figure 3, is helpful:
EXPECTED ACTUAL
COST-ADJUSTED COST-ADJUSTED COST-ADJUSTED
VALUE OF KODAK VALUE OF KODAK VALUE OF KODAK
EQUIPMENT AND EQUIPMENT AND EQUIPMENT WITH
KODAK SERVICE KODAK SERVICE ISO SERVICE
EXPERIENCE
. J COST
TO  Td  Tf
Experience Costs and Pre-Purchase Lock-In
for Kodak Equipment.
In Figure 4, as in Figure 3, the experience costs are divided into two
kinds: those incurred as the buyer is learning about the product,
shown by upward-sloping hatching, and those incurred after the buyer
has learned of unexpected costs, shown by downward-sloping hatch-ing. In Figure 4, as in Figure 3, the dividing point between these two
periods is shown as Td.
As Figure 4 is constructed, the buyer is assumed to anticipate a
level of Kodak service that would provide greater value than her alter-
native, ISO service."' The actual quality of Kodak service, however,
141. It would also be possible in Figure 4 to distinguish between the expected and ac-
tual values of ISO service. As will shortly become apparent, though, the expected value of
ISO service has little independent significance. In any event, because of the tie requiring
that Kodak equipment owners use Kodak service, the buyer is not actually presented with
a choice combining Kodak equipment and ISO service; the buyer's alternative is that of
equipment of another manufacturer and ISO service.
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is lower than that of ISO service. In these circumstances, it would be
possible to treat as the buyer's experience costs either the difference
between expected and actual Kodak service costs or the difference be-
tween ISO and (actual) Kodak service costs. Nelson's comparison of
actual costs with the costs of a potential alternative 142 suggests that
the experience-cost measure should be the difference between Kodak
and ISO service. 143 However, although the difference between Kodak
and ISO service is the measure of the equipment owner's losses-Nel-
son's concernm '44 -it is not the measure of the buyer's uncertainty at
the time of purchase1 45 The buyer makes her purchasing decision on
the basis of the expected value of Kodak service, so for market power
purposes that is the value that should be the reference against which
actual Kodak service value is compared. The value of ISO service
should be considered only for damage calculations. 46
Thus, Figure 4 shows that, because the expected value of Kodak
service is greater than that of ISO service,147 a buyer would be likely
to purchase Kodak equipment even if she knew that she would be
required to purchase Kodak service over the entire life of the equip-
ment. However, because, referring again to Figure 4, Kodak service
performs less well than the buyer expected, the unexpectedly poor
performance will cause her to suffer experience costs. Furthermore,
to the extent that the tie locks her in to Kodak service, and to those
experience costs, she will suffer from them for the life of her equip-
ment (Tf), rather than just until she learns of the poor quality of Ko-
142. See supra part III.B-C.
143. In Figure 4, Nelson's comparison would lead to a lower market power measure
than the text proposes. That would not always be the case, however. See supra note 141.
144. Because Nelson was discussing an iterative purchase process, each of the purchases
after the first could be compared to the previously best-performing purchase. See supra
text accompanying note 111. When, as in Figure 4, the buyer has made no previous
purchase, the benchmark for comparison can only be the buyer's expectation.
145. The Kodak-ISO difference would, however, be the relevant measure if the tie were
imposed after the purchase and the buyer had been using ISO service, because in that case
the buyer's expectation would be determined by the ISO service that she had experienced.
See supra note 144.
146. In Figure 4, then, the buyer's damages would be the difference between the actual
value of Kodak service and the actual value of ISO service, an amount less than the uncer-
tainty that determines Kodak's market power. It should be noted, though, that if the actual
value of Kodak service were greater than the value of ISO service, the buyer's damages
would be the difference between the expected and actual values of Kodak service. In other
words, the buyer's damages can be no greater than her uncertainty, because the uncer-
tainty is the shortfall between her actual service value and that which she voluntarily chose
to purchase.
147. Assume that in Figure 4 the expected and actual values of ISO service are equal.




dak service (at Td). Thus, the tie increases the information costs the
buyer faces, despite her pre-purchase knowledge of it. The increase in
those costs provides the seller with power over the price of the
equipment.
2. Calculating Information-Based Market Power
Part III described how the total cost of uncertainty can be com-
puted for the lifetime of a product by adding the experience costs for
the years of the product's useful life, and the preceding section de-
fined the experience costs for Kodak equipment. 148 Together, then,
these two portions of the Article define quantitatively the information
costs faced by a Kodak equipment buyer.149 The significance of those
costs can only be assessed, however, by comparing them to some
threshold of market power. A logical source for that threshold mea-
sure is the Department of Justice's merger guidelines, 50 which pro-
pose as a rule of thumb that market power is present if a seller has the
148. That is, the experience costs are calculated by the integration described in note 119
supra and the accompanying text. The result for total experience costs is
T
f (expected value (t) - actual value (t)) dt.
TO
It is important to note, though, that the increase in experience costs due to the tie is only
that portion of those costs that accumulate after Td, which is
T
J (expected value (t) - actual value (t)) dt.
Td
It is this latter quantity that measures the buyer's damages. The buyer suffers no antitrust
damages before Td, because (assuming the manufacturer-seller has no non-information-
based power in the equipment market) the buyer freely chooses to accept the manufac-
turer's service in the first year. It is only after Td, when the buyer has learned of the
higher-than-expected costs of the manufacturer's service, that the tie forces her to continue
to incur those costs. Cf supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text (discussing analogous
damages issues).
149. The buyer's experience costs are, of course, reduced to the extent that she is able
to obtain information through search. However, the use of the buyer's expectation of
product value as the benchmark against which experience is measured, as described supra
144-46 and accompanying text, allows the incorporation of search information into that
expectation so that experience costs will reflect the buyer's net uncertainty. It must be
remembered, though, that search costs should be added to experience costs to yield the
buyer's total information costs. See also infra note 154 (noting that the amount of available
information may differ among buyers).
150. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 [hereinafter 1992
MERGER GUIDELNES]; 1984 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984), re-
printed in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103 [hereinafter 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES];
1982 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1982), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,102 [hereinafter 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES].
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ability to maintain price at a level five percent higher than the com-
petitive level for one year.15 1 Although the specific five-percent test
of the guidelines should not be used uncritically, 52 it is generally ac-
cepted as a rough measure of market power, even in non-merger
cases.1 5 3 Of the two elements of the guidelines' test-price (five per-
cent above the competitive level) and persistence (for one year)-the
latter was easily met in the circumstances of the Kodak tie. The effect
of the tie was to impose a requirement on the buyer that it use Ko-
dak's service for the life of the Kodak copier, which was considerably
longer than one year. Whether market power was present in Kodak
then depends on whether the total information allowed Kodak to raise
prices by five percent.
In general, as described in Part III, a seller can charge a price that
exceeds the competitive level by the amount of the information costs
faced by buyers.'5 4 Therefore, to determine whether Kodak could
151. The five-percent-for-one-year test was introduced in 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 150, § II A and reaffirmed in 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 2.11.
It provides specificity to the Guidelines' more formal and flexible test of a "small but sig-
nificant and nontransitory" price increase. Id. The 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES replaced
the one-year period in the five-percent test with a period defined as the "foreseeable fu-
ture." 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 1.11.
This price-increase test is actually used in the merger guidelines as a means of defining
a relevant market. It is nevertheless a measure of market power:
The Guidelines define a market as a group of products and a geographic area
such that a hypothetical firm that is the only present and future seller of those
products in that area would possess market power-the power profitably to re-
strict output and to raise prices. A firm that is the only present seller of those
products in that area would not be able to exercise market power, if its attempt to
impose a small but significant and nontransitory price increase would cause buy-
ers to switch to other products or to products in other areas or would induce
other firms to begin selling those particular products.
1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 150, Statement, § 1 (erroneous punctuation
omitted).
152. "[W]hat constitutes a 'small but significant and nontransitory' increase in price will
depend on the nature of the industry... ." 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 150,
§ 1.11.
153. See, e.g., Hay, supra note 54, at 812-13 (including merger-guideline test among
general measures of market power); Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 1451 (referring to
merger guidelines in context of selecting market-power threshold, but suggesting that "a
ten percent rule seems justified by the reality of product differentiated markets"),
154. The amount of information available might differ for different buyers. For exam-
ple, a large company might use many Kodak copiers and thereby gain considerable experi-
ence with their operating expenses, but the company might not make that information
public (perhaps feeling that there is no reason why its competitors should gain from its
experience). In that case, an antitrust claim based on information costs could not be made
by the large company. It is important to note, though, that the presence of some informed
buyers would not prevent valid information-based claims from being brought by buyers
who do not have access to the same information. There is some confusion regarding this
issue in Areeda and Hovenkamp's discussion of Kodak. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
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raise its overall prices by five percent, the Kodak information costs
must be compared to the total cost of the product, the equipment-and-
parts-and-service package. 5 Table 1 provides a numerical example
of how this calculation can be made, roughly following the graphical
example of Figure 4. Consider the purchase of a copier, with a useful
life of ten years, in 1994 for $200,000. Assume that service from Ko-
dak costs $10,000 per year at the time of purchase, while service from
an ISO costs $8,000 per year at that time, and that the cost of each
increases by 10% per year. Assume further that the buyer expects
Kodak service to be 25% more valuable than the ISO's, but that it is
actually only 12.5% more valuable. Under those assumptions, the ex-
pected value-adjusted cost of Kodak service ($7,500 per year in 1994)
is less than the cost of ISO service, but actual Kodak costs ($8,750 per
year in 1994) are greater than ISO costs, as is represented in Figure
4.156 Finally, assume a discount rate of 5% per year. The buyer's in-
formation costs are then calculated as shown in Table 1, below:
supra note 4, 1709.2. Initially, they say that a Kodak-like tie will not create market power
unless "[a] substantial number of... customers are too 'unsophisticated' [i.e., uninformed]
to protect themselves by judicious interbrand comparisons before they become locked in."
Id. 1709.2a (footnote and internal reference omitted). They do not explain why, how-
ever, it is necessary that there be a "substantial" number of uninformed buyers. Perhaps
they intend only to acknowledge the tying-law requirement that a "substantial" volume of
commerce be foreclosed, Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984),
or to exclude cases in which only a small number of customers with unique needs are
exploited, see infra note 178. In fact, they acknowledge that a tie imposed on uninformed
buyers would be unlawful even if some other buyers were informed so that a tie as to them
would be lawful. AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 4, 1709.2(f)(2)(E). It is true,
though, as Areeda and Hovenkamp point out, that if continued equipment purchases by
the informed buyers were important to the seller, the seller would only be able to exploit
uninformed buyers if it could price-discriminate between the informed and uninformed
groups. See id. 1709.2(e)(3).
155. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 1456-57 ("Presumptively, then, evidence of price
discrimination or of higher prices in repair contracts, or in the purchase price of replace-
ment parts, should count as evidence of substantial market power in the aftermarket only if
the evidence would count in that fashion when the total cost of owning a photocopier is
taken into account.").
156. The better performance is represented in the table by reducing the manufacturer's
service costs by the amount of the performance premiums. The difference can be thought
of as the value (of copier services, for example) that would be lost if ISO service were used.
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TABLE 1. INFORMATION COST CALCULATIONS 15 7
Anticipated Experienced Experienced
Savings of Difference Difference
Expected Expected Actual Between Between
Mfr.'s Mfr.'s Mfr.'s Expected Actual
Value- Service Value- and Actual Mfr.'s and
Adjusted ISO's Costs Over Adjusted Mfr.'s ISO's
Service Service ISO Service Service Service Service
Year Cost Cost Costs Cost Costs Costs
1994 7500 8000 500 8750 1250 750
1995 8250 8800 550 9625 1375 825
1996 9075 9680 605 10588 1513 908
1997 9983 10648 666 11646 1664 998
1998 10981 11713 732 12811 1830 1098
1999 12079 12884 805 14092 2013 1208
2000 13287 14172 886 15501 2214 1329
2001 14615 15590 974 17051 2436 1462
2002 16077 17149 1072 18756 2679 1607
2003 17685 18864 1179 20632 2947 1768
Total 1195311 127499[ 79691 1394521 19922 11953
Total
Present
Value 91004 97114 6070 106218 15174 9104
Total Purchase Price =
Initial Equipment Purchase Price ($200,000)+ 306218
Present Value of Actual Service
Costs ($106,218)
Market Power Measure =
Present Value of Information Cost ($ 15,174) I
Total Purchase Price ($ 306,218) 4.955%
Damages =
Present Value of Difference Between Actual Service Costs
and ISO Service Costs for Years 1995-2003 9104
157. Some of the figures in Table 1 do not add up exactly because of rounding errors.
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Under the adopted assumptions, the buyer's information costs
are almost exactly the five percent of the overall purchase price that
the merger guidelines suggest as a threshold.' The information costs
would therefore be at a level sufficient to provide Kodak with market
power. It is not enough, though, that information costs are sufficient
to create market power; a seller will be able to extract the full infor-
mation-cost premium only if it will cost the buyer more to switch than
to pay the premium. Therefore, Kodak will gain market power from
the five-percent level of information costs only if switching costs also
meet or exceed that level.' 59 For a durable good like the Kodak cop-
ier of Table 1, though, the buyer would almost certainly have to sacri-
fice far more than five percent of the copier's overall costs (or seven-
and-one-half percent of the cost of the equipment alone 60 ) in resale
158. See Lande, supra note 126, at 195 ("Information imperfections might mean that
Kodak could raise the price of its package 5 percent above the competitive level
successfully.").
159. As Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp have it, "one should ask ... whether a
customer's switching costs (such as unamortized machine price minus resale value plus
non-shiftable investments in training and accessories) after some transition period (say,
two years) exceed some multiple of the alleged above-market premium for the primary-
secondary package for the remaining useful life of the primary product." AREEDA &
HovEqN Amp, supra note 4, 1709.2(c)(5). In this Article, the multiple proposed is 1,
because a switching cost that exceeds a buyer's information cost is sufficient to allow a
seller to exploit that information cost. As the comment of Professors Areeda and
Hovenkamp suggests, though, the text and Table 1 neglect a complication. As the buyer's
ownership period passes, both her switching costs and the amount that she has yet to lose
through experience costs decrease. Therefore, it will not always be sufficient to determine
just whether the switching costs at time TO exceed experience costs (and whether both
exceed a market-power threshold). The more precise question is whether, over the course
of the buyer's ownership period, switching costs exceed the remaining portion of the expe-
rience costs premium at each time. Referring back to Table 1, the question is whether
switching costs exceed the present value of the remaining information costs for each year,
if switching costs are lower than information costs for any year, it is the lower switching
costs that should be used in calculating market power. Representing this distinction more
formally, the quantity of interest for determining market power is not
Tf
switching cost (To), f )expected value (t) - actual value (t)) dt
TO
as would be suggested supra in note 122 and accompanying text, but is
Tf
f min [switching cost (t), (expected value (t) - actual value (t))]
dt.
TO
This point is neglected in the text because the additional complexity that it introduces
obscures the basic point, and because if switching costs are high, as they are for most
durable goods, the result does not change.
160. That is, $15,174 / 200,000, which is approximately equal to 7.5%.
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value alone if she were to switch to another brand. Therefore, in the
example of Table 1, Kodak would have information-based market
power.161 Because the numbers assumed in constructing that table
were chosen to be quite plausible, it appears that the possibility of
such market power is not merely an academic concern.
B. General Implications of Information-Based Market Power
As shown in the preceding sections, a case like Kodak can be
fruitfully analyzed in terms of market power created by information
deficiencies. However, although Part III showed that this approach is
well supported by the economic literature,'162 its legal status is unclear.
The following sections turn to a consideration of the specific antitrust-
law implications of this Article's interpretation of Kodak. The first
section discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Jefferson Parish
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 63 in which the Court said that infor-
mation costs "do not generate the kind of market power that justifies
condemnation of tying."' 64 Although this statement appears to con-
ffict with the approach to Kodak described here, it will be seen below
that the markets in the two cases functioned quite differently, and that
Jefferson Parish's rationale for denying the importance of information
costs is not applicable in cases like Kodak. The subsequent section
discusses information-based market power in the context of the broad
criticisms of tying law made by Chicago School commentators, and,
perhaps surprisingly, shows that an information-based tie is in some
respects more of a competitive danger than typical ties, and in fact is
not subject to the Chicago School critique. The third section com-
pares the tying-based information restriction of Kodak with collec-
tively imposed information restrictions in two other Supreme Court
cases; it shows that the Court's treatment of the informational effects
in Kodak was consistent with those cases. The final section in this part
comments on the possibility of legitimate justifications for tie-ins in
the presence of information costs.
161. The damages suffered by the buyer are not generally the same as the buyer's infor-
mation costs. See supra text accompanying notes 14446. In the example represented in
the table, as its last line indicates, the buyer's damages would be the present value of the
difference between the service costs paid by the buyer (the manufacturer's actual service
costs) and the costs that the buyer could have paid in the absence of the tie (the ISO's
service costs), but would not include the cost difference for the first year, the period in
which the buyer first learned through experience of the higher manufacturer costs. See
supra note 148.
162. See supra part III.
163. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
164. Id. at 27.
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1. Product Information and Consumer Decision-Making
Both the majority and the dissent in Kodak relied upon the dis-
cussion of informational considerations in Jefferson Parish,6 ' which is
not surprising in view of the Jefferson Parish Court's apparently incon-
sistent statements on the matter. Jefferson Parish seemed to recognize
the possibility of information-based market power in its acknowledg-
ment that a consumer could be forced to accept a tied product combi-
nation "by an inability to evaluate the true cost of either product
when they are available only as a package."' 66 At the same time,
though, the Court appeared to reject information costs as a source of
market power. Addressing the conclusion of the court of appeals that
consumers in the medical-services markets at issue in Jefferson Parish
were both insensitive to price, because of third-party payments by in-
surers, and unable to evaluate the quality of medical services,167 the
Court said that although "these factors may generate 'market power'
in some abstract sense, they do not generate the kind of market power
that justifies condemnation of tying.'1 68
Explanation of this apparent inconsistency is not as difficult as it
at first seems. 69 In Jefferson Parish, the challenged tie was one that
165. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085 n.19 (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15,27), 2097-98
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15.
167. Id. at 27 (citing Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286, 290 (5th
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 2 (1984)).
168. Id. (footnote omitted).
169. An explanation different from the one offered here is provided by the Third Cir-
cuit in Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 196 (1992), discussed infra in the text accompanying notes
270-74. The Town Sound court suggested that Jefferson Parish's skepticism regarding infor-
mation-based market power would not exist where the information problems involved
were induced by the seller. Id. at 490 n.30. It viewed Jefferson Parish as rejecting liability
for an information-based tie derived from "a preexisting and continuing problem of price
and quality competition." Id. In Town Sound, in contrast, the court said that the claim
against Chrysler was one in which "the tie-in has induced a market failure, not merely
taken advantage of an existing one." Id.
This appears to be a conception of causation similar to the discussion in this Article of
market power created by ties. See infra part IV.B.2. If so, however, the tie in Jefferson
Parish could, like that in Town Sound, have caused an informational market failure and
therefore have created market power. That possibility was not considered in Town Sound,
though it would seem to follow from the comments in Jefferson Parish itself referring to
consumers' "inability to evaluate the true cost of either [tying or tied] product when they
are available only as a package." Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15. The discussion of Jeffer-
son Parish in the text takes a different tack by focusing not on information costs, but on
switching costs.
One commentator has also discussed a causation requirement in the information-
based tie context, suggesting that lower courts should impose such a requirement. See
Jacobs, supra note 3, at 371-73. Professor Jacobs's short discussion of the causation re-
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required patients at the hospital who were receiving services that re-
quired anesthesia to use one of the anesthesiologists with whom the
hospital had a contract.1 70 The key to the Court's view of the informa-
tion-cost argument is found in its response to the claim that patients
had insufficient information to evaluate the quality of hospital serv-
ices: "[I]f consumers cannot evaluate the quality of anesthesiological
services, it follows that they are indifferent between certified anesthe-
siologists even in the absence of a tying arrangement-such an ar-
rangement cannot be said to have foreclosed a choice that would have
otherwise been made 'on the merits.' .171 This statement makes clear
that the Court in Jefferson Parish relied on a perception that buyers
who accepted anesthesiology services that they allegedly did not want
were "indifferent" regarding those services-that there was no coer-
cion (pre- or post-purchase) at work.'72 Justice Scalia echoed this
quirement does not fully define that requirement, but he is apparently arguing for a
stronger conception of causation than that discussed infra part IV.B.2. However, Professor
Jacobs admits that Kodak does not support his view: "Kodak's silence on this point leads
logically to an inference that causation [in creation of information gaps] does not matter
and that a firm can derive 'market power' even from structural information gaps." Jacobs,
supra note 3, at 371.
In any event, Professor Jacobs's primary concern appears to be that firms in markets
where there are structural market imperfections "have had market power 'thrust upon'
them; their mere presence in a particular kind of market accounts for their 'power,' which
they can discard only by abandoning that market." Id. at 371-72. But his conclusion does
not follow from his premise. Although it may be true that there are markets in which firms
will necessarily have market power, it does not follow that to avoid antitrust liability those
firms must leave those markets. No case suggests that information gaps in themselves will
create antitrust liability. Liability arises only when information deficiencies, and the mar-
ket power derived from them, are used to perform some act, such as tying, forbidden by
the antitrust laws. A firm with structural information-based market power can avoid anti-
trust liability simply by avoiding the limited number of practices that the antitrust laws
prohibit.
170. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 5-7.
171. Id. at 28.
172. The Jefferson Parish Court's impression of consumer indifference is understanda-
ble when the case's prior history is considered. The Court made its statements on this issue
in the context of the conclusion of the court of appeals regarding the "market imperfec-
tions" in the medical services market. See supra text accompanying note 167. But the
court of appeals had not emphasized a lack of information at all. Instead, it focused on two
other factors: consumer indifference to price due to third-party payment and consumer
preference for non-profit institutions due to an expectation that such institutions would be
less likely to skimp on quality. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286,
290 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). In light of these factors, it concluded that
consumers chose hospitals largely based on location. See id. at 290-91. The court of ap-
peals did observe that there was "a lack of complete information regarding the quality of
medical care offered." Id. at 290. However, it is not clear what significance the court
accorded this fact, in that it also said that the district court's conclusion had been that
patients chose hospitals based on location "for the convenience of the family," id., not due
to a lack of information.
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view in his Kodak dissent, where he cited Jefferson Parish in arguing
that the Court had "never suggested that the principal players in a
market with such commonplace informational deficiencies (and, thus,
bands of apparent consumer pricing indifference) exercise market
power in any sense relevant to the antitrust laws." '173 This extrapola-
tion from Jefferson Parish to Kodak was inappropriate, though; even if
consumer indifference was a plausible possibility in Jefferson Parish, it
was not in Kodak.
Although consumers of anesthesiological (and hospital) services
in Jefferson Parish, like consumers of repair services in Kodak, could
generally determine the value of those services only through exper-
iencing them,174 the buyers in Jefferson Parish, unlike those in Kodak,
were not locked in after obtaining information through experience.
After a first treatment by a particular hospital-anesthesiologist pack-
age, in which the quality of the providers was experienced, a patient
who needed such services again could make the choice to receive the
future services at a different hospital, where she could obtain the serv-
ices of a different anesthesiologist.'75 In other words, patients in Jef-
ferson Parish had no switching costs.
The absence of switching costs is essential, because, as described
above,'1 7 6 only in the presence of switching costs do information costs
have antitrust significance. The lack of switching costs makes the Jef-
ferson Parish Court's statements regarding "indifference" accurate.
Prior to obtaining information regarding anesthesiology services, the
buyer might indeed have been indifferent among anesthesiologists, as
173. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2097-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia did not explain
how one distinguishes between "commonplace" information deficiencies and those of anti-
trust significance.
174. The Fifth Circuit noted the lack of available information regarding medical serv-
ices. Jefferson Parish, 686 F.2d at 290.
175. This statement refers primarily to relatively minor difficulties with anesthesiology
services, such as, for example, a patient's dissatisfaction with her pre- and post-operative
contact (or lack of contact) with the anesthesiologist. In most cases, little cost would be
incurred in correcting such problems by switching to another anesthesiologist and hospital
if an additional operation were required. (This might not be true, however, if the patient's
physician did not have staff privileges at another hospital, so that to switch the patient
would be required to incur the costs of obtaining and establishing a relationship with a new
doctor, or if the patient's condition were serious enough that she could not be moved. In
such circumstances, the difficulty of moving to another hospital could create switching
costs.) Other difficulties with anesthesiology services can, of course, cause very serious
medical problems that cannot be remedied by switching to an alternative anesthesiologist.
Assuming that one wants to apply economic analysis to such problems, it is still true that
even very serious health problems generally would not (with the second exception noted
above) increase switching costs; they would instead be an example of experiencing exceed-
ingly high information costs.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
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Kodak equipment purchasers would have been among service organi-
zations in the absence of analogous information. However, in each
case, consumers after experiencing the services at issue might no
longer have been indifferent, and it is at that point that the two cases
differ. After patients in Jefferson Parish had experienced the services
of the hospital-affiliated anesthesiologists, they would have been able
to exercise their preferences by switching to other providers. Kodak
equipment owners, though, would have been unable to switch to an-
other brand of service without incurring switching costs, even after
ascertaining that they did not want Kodak service. 17 7 Hence, the
Supreme Court was right both in dismissing concerns about informa-
tion costs in Jefferson Parish and in relying on the importance of such
concerns in Kodak.7 '
2. Information-Based Market Power and the Chicago School
In its focus on the consumer's decision-making process, the ap-
proach to market power presented in this Article has a narrower
177. If, contrary to the statements above, there had been switching costs in Jefferson
Parish, the same competitive problems as in Kodak would have existed. That could have
been the case, for example, if patients of the defendant hospital were frequently subjects of
multiple operations, and changes from one hospital to another during the course of those
operations would have created difficulties. In that case, the difficulties of changing from
one hospital to another would have constituted switching costs, and the patients could
indeed have been forced by the tie (and by the information and switching costs) to use
anesthesiologists whom they did not want. In such circumstances, the tie should be treated
as anticompetitive on the same basis as that in Kodak, i.e., if the information-based market
power of the seller is of sufficient magnitude and character to meet the market power test
described previously.
One other circumstance that might create an information-cost problem in the Jefferson
Parish context should perhaps be noted. If a buyer had previously received anesthesiology
services from, or was otherwise familiar with, a particular anesthesiologist, the hospital's
requirement that she use an anesthesiologist from its group, one with which she was not
familiar, would make it more difficult for the buyer to evaluate the services that she would
be likely to receive. This might impose information costs on the buyer, but they are infor-
mation costs that should not be a subject of antitrust concern. In many circumstances,
there will be particular buyers who have specific reasons for desiring a particular selling
arrangement. The antitrust laws, however, are not concerned with such unique needs; they
are concerned only with broader market considerations. See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of
New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1988).
178. The references to "indifference" in this discussion refer to indifference between
two goods whose effective prices cannot be precisely determined, not to indifference re-
garding price in general. The latter is true indifference, but the former is "indifference"
forced on the buyer by a lack of information. There is some ambiguity in the Jefferson
Parish opinion regarding this distinction. Forced indifference between two products was at
issue in the Court's discussion of consumers' inability to distinguish the quality of alterna-
tive sources of medical services, but the Fifth Circuit also discussed consumers' true indif-
ference regarding price deriving from the payment of their medical bills by insurers. See




applicability than traditional tying doctrine. The approach here does
not address tying arrangements that are coercive in the traditional
sense of forcing consumers who are fully informed about their alterna-
tives to accept a disfavored alternative.'7 9 The goal of the present ap-
proach is only to ensure that sellers do not define their products in
such a way as to make it more difficult for consumers to obtain and
use information regarding those products. Because the means by
which such product definition occurs in a tying case is through the tie
itself, a peculiar circumstance arises: An information-based tie,
though a product of market power to the extent that consumers are
made to accept it, is also itself a source of market power through its
creation of uncertainty. Although it may seem odd that the same ty-
ing arrangement could simultaneously create and exploit market
power, the idea is less surprising when one looks at a tie as a means
for the seller to define its product, and the information available con-
cerning it, in a particular way.
The tie allows the seller to transform what would otherwise be
short-term uncertainty regarding the value of the tied product into
long-term uncertainty regarding the tying-tied product combination.
By defining the product combination to require use of the tied prod-
uct for the entire useful life of the tying product, preventing the buyer
from switching to an alternative after a short experience with the tied
product, the seller amplifies any uncertainty in the tied product's
value. Referring back to Table 1, where Kodak equipment was as-
sumed to have a useful life of ten years, the seller increased what
would otherwise have been the uncertainty of, for example, a one-
year service contract, by ten times. The resulting increase in informa-
tion-based market power is thus a direct result of the tie.
Notably, this effect distinguishes information-based ties from the
tying arrangements assumed by Chicago School tying analysis, and in
fact renders the condemnation of information-based ties consistent
with the Chicago analysis. The Chicago approach to ties'80 is based on
'the unstated assumption that imposition of a tie does not affect the
seller's market power, because that power is founded in the tying
product market. The seller's imposition of the tie, the argument runs,
179. See supra notes 32, 54.
180. The Chicago School approach to ties was first systematically set out in Ward S.
Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957), and
it has since been applied frequently by Chicago adherents to criticize antitrust tying law.
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WrrH ITSELF
365-81 (1978); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53
ANTrrRusT L. 135, 143-45 (1984); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 926 (1979).
1994]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
is only one means among many of exercising the constant and preex-
isting market power of the seller.181 For example, the seller could,
instead of imposing a tie, simply use its market power to raise the
price of the tying product; if it instead chooses to impose a tie, it will
make the product less attractive to buyers and will therefore no longer
be able to raise the price, or will not be able to raise it as high. 8 The
Chicago analysis then argues that one means of exercising market
power is much like another, so that the antitrust laws should not treat
tying differently from a permissible practice such as a direct price
increase.1 83
Although this final step in the Chicago argument, asserting that
sellers should be permitted to exploit their market power over buyers
in any way they choose, is debatable,&4 even those who accept that
view presumably do not approve of practices that increase a seller's
market power.'85 Hence, even adherents of the Chicago analysis
should concede that it does not apply to tie-ins that create market
power (as distinguished from those that merely exploit it). In some
circumstances-one of them being an aftermarket tie in the face of
uncertainty-a seller can have more market power in the combination
of tying and tied product than he would have had in the tying product
alone. This is so because, as described above, by selling the primary
market (tying) product with an aftermarket (tied) product whose
value is uncertain, the seller imports the uncertainty into the sale of
181. See Easterbrook, supra note 180, at 143-44 ("The seller can take its monopoly
profit only once.").
182. See BORI, supra note 180, at 372-74; Posner, supra note 180, at 926 ("[A]n in-
crease in the price charged for the tied product will, as a first approximation, reduce the
price that the purchaser is willing to pay for the tying product.").
183. The view that ties cannot cause any more harm in the market than would a direct
price increase is actually held only by the more strict Chicago advocates. See BORK, supra
note 180, at 374-75 (rejecting possibility that ties could raise entry barriers in the tied prod-
uct market); Easterbrook, supra note 180, at 144-45 (arguing that the entry barriers from
ties "are sufficiently rare that they cannot support any presumption against (or even suspi-
cion of) the practices"). Other, less doctrinaire Chicago scholars are willing to consider the
possibility that ties could cause competitive harm. See infra note 185.
184. See generally Keith K. Wollenberg, An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Re-ex-
amining the Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REv. 737, 753-56 (1987) (discussing possible
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of ties).
185. For example, Judge Posner, like other Chicago adherents, rejects the leverage the-
ory of ties. See supra note 180 (citing sources). Instead, he has described price discrimina-
tion among buyers, which is competitively more benign, as the primary effect (and
purpose) of ties. Posner, supra note 180, at 926. Judge Posner observes, however, that,
contrary to the initial Chicago view, the price-discrimination effects of tie-ins can cause
greater market misallocation than would a simple single-price monopoly. Id. at 934-35.
He therefore seems willing at least to consider that ties might be anticompetitive: "In the
light of such criticism, the original Chicago analysis of the effects of tie-ins now seems a
little oversimple." Id. at 935.
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the two-product combination, 186 thus creating market power. Because
the creation of market power as a result of a tie is contrary to the
assumption of constant and preexisting market power on which the
Chicago analysis rests, that analysis is inapplicable in these
circumstances.
3. The Supreme Court and Market Information
The particular characteristics of information-based aftermarket
ties distinguish them from "traditional" ties and link them with some
other superficially different cases. Whereas typical ties operate by
forcing buyers knowingly to accept unwanted products, information-
186. It might be argued that if the additional market power in this arrangement derives
from uncertainty related to the aftermarket product, perhaps it is that aftermarket product,
rather than the primary market product, that should be considered the tying product. Af-
ter all, if the primary market (tying) product has no market power in itself, how can it force
a buyer to take an undesired aftermarket product? The answer lies in the relationship
between the primary and aftermarkets. Because purchasers of primary market products
are also committing to later purchases of aftermarket products, uncertainty with respect to
the aftermarket is also felt as uncertainty in the primary market. Therefore, some buyers,
with incomplete information, will purchase the primary market product-in Kodak, Kodak
equipment-when they would not otherwise have done so, or would have done so only at a
lower price. This is exactly the point emphasized by the Kodak Court in its discussion of
the difficulty of lifecycle pricing. 112 S. Ct. at 2085. Recall that the view expressed in
Kodak was that consumers would find it difficult to determine the overall cost of the equip-
ment-and-parts-and-service package, which would cause "a less responsive connection be-
tween service and parts prices and equipment sales." Id at 2085. Moreover, some
uncertainty will derive from the tying product, but be exploitable only through control of
the tied product, so that market power derived from that uncertainty will also be a product
of the tie. That was the case, for example, for equipment reliability in Kodak. Costs that
were the product of the combination of unanticipatedly low equipment reliability and the
cost difference between Kodak and ISO service were products of the tie, and should there-
fore be included in the experience cost measure in Figure 4. These costs result because if
reliability is low, service is needed frequently, and any differences in service cost or quality
provided by different service organizations are magnified.
The primary market is also central because if the buyer can freely switch to another
brand of aftermarket service, information-based market power cannot be exploited. (At
least, it cannot be fully exploited. As Kodak pointed out, Kodak could have lost some
customers while still obtaining sufficient supracompetitive prices from its remaining cus-
tomers to make its tying practice profitable. See id. at 2084.). An aftermarket tie requires
switching costs. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23. Although such costs might be
present in small amounts even in the aftermarket alone (a Kodak equipment owner would
sacrifice some investment in switching to ISO service merely by abandoning a Kodak main-
tenance agreement), they are made much greater by imposing a tie, because, to switch
then, the buyer must abandon the primary market product. Hence, the seller uses the tie
to ensure that the buyer is locked in to the expensive primary market product. In this role,
that primary market product clearly serves a tying function: it is the buyer's investment in
Kodak equipment that forces it to remain with Kodak service. Thus, although the market
power in an aftermarket tie ultimately derives from information gaps in the aftermarket,
and is most easily measured in that market, the power is also present in, and in fact is
actually exercised in, the primary market.
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based ties achieve their coercive effect by forcing buyers to make
purchasing decisions on the basis of limited information.18 In this
way, aftermarket ties are in some respects similar to other, more ex-
plicit actions by sellers to restrict the information available about their
products. As the paragraphs below describe, the Supreme Court has
considered several of these other information-restricting efforts, and it
has treated them quite severely. Therefore, the claim that Kodak is
unprecedented among the Supreme Court's decisions,188 though
strictly true in that the Court has not reached a similar conclusion in a
tying case, seems inaccurate when considered in the context of the
Court's decisions in its other information-related cases.
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,189
the Court considered a Justice Department challenge to an "ethical"
rule of the National Society of Professional Engineers that required its
members to make their initial project proposals to potential clients
without price information and to reveal prices only after the engineers
were chosen for jobs (at which point clients could withdraw and begin
the selection process again). 190 The Supreme Court took pains to em-
phasize that the society's rule did not fix prices.191 The rule's restraint
187. Some of the mechanisms through which this occurs are described in Grimes, supra
note 4, at 272-82.
188. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
189. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
190. Specifically, the society's rule required that proposals to customers by member
engineers be submitted without price information; if a potential client insisted on price
information, the engineer was to withdraw from consideration for the job. Id. at 683-84.
An engineer could negotiate with a client over price, but only after she was chosen for the
job. Id. at 684 n.6. If no agreement were reached, the client could then withdraw from the
negotiations with that engineer and choose a new one to begin the process again. Id.
191. Id. at 692 ("While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement."). The dis-
trict court had treated the case as one of price-fixing. United States v. National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C. 1975), affd, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir.
1977), affd, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). That is, the court looked at the case largely from the
seller's point of view, noting that the rule "tends to 'cripple the freedom of traders and
thereby restrain[s] their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.' " United
States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193, 1200 (D.D.C. 1974)
(quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)), vacated and
remanded, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975), original judgment reaffirmed after remand, 404 F. Supp.
457 (D.D.C. 1975), affd, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), affd, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)). It did,
however, note that the "prospective client is thus forced to make his selection without all
relevant market information." Id. The court of appeals emphasized this informational as-
pect of the case, stating that "[d]efendant's prohibition of competitive bidding, by blocking
the free flow of price information, strikes at the functioning of the free market." United
States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1977), af-fd,
435 U.S. 679 (1978). Furthermore, the court focused on the process of communicating and
evaluating prices. It disapproved of the Society's rule in part because "[it does not take
into account the sophistication of the purchaser, the complexity of the project, or the pro-
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on information was, however, an obstacle to the competitive process.
The Court said that "the [bidding] ban 'impede[d] the ordinary give
and take of the market place,' and substantially deprive[d] the cus-
tomer of 'the ability to utilize and compare prices in selecting engi-
neering services.' "- Therefore, the rule "[o]n its face" restrained
trade within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.193
Professional Engineers involved a restraint on price information,
which the Court could have been expected to treat harshly,19 4 but the
Court has been no more accepting of restrictions on the provision of
non-price information. In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,195 a
group of dentists agreed collectively to resist requests by dental insur-
ers to provide x-rays for use in evaluating treatments. 96 The Court
had no difficulty in deciding that the practice was anticompetitive:
A concerted and effective effort to withhold (or make more
costly) information desired by consumers for the purpose of
determining whether a particular purchase is cost-justified is
likely enough to disrupt the proper functioning of the price-
setting mechanism of the market that it may be condemned
even absent proof that it resulted in higher prices or, as here,
the purchase of higher priced services, than would occur in
its absence. 197
Tellingly, much of this passage could also have been applied to the
Kodak facts: Kodak's definition of its product to effectively require
future parts and service purchases of uncertain cost could also be de-
scribed as an "effort to ... make more costly.., information desired
by consumers for the purpose of determining whether a particular
purchase is cost-justified."
Although it may seem a stretch to compare a vertical restraint
like Kodak's tying arrangement to the horizontal restraints in Profes-
sional Engineers and Indiana Federation of Dentists, the Court's ratio-
nales in these cases are similar. In Professional Engineers and Indiana
Federation of Dentists, the Court did not focus so much on the acts of
cedures for evaluating price information." Id. at 982. Thus, the court of appeals, like the
Supreme Court, focused on the buyer, not the seller.
192. Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692-93 (quoting United States v. National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C. 1975), affd, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir.
1977), aff'd, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)).
193. Id. at 693.
194. As the Court reaffirmed in Professional Eng'rs, "[p]rice is the 'central nervous
system of the economy.' " Id. at 692 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940)).
195. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
196. Id. at 449-51.
197. Id. at 461-62.
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the sellers in agreeing to restrict information as on the effect of those
agreements on the decision-making of buyers. Thus, in Professional
Engineers, the Court emphasized that the defendants' actions were
not price-fixing but nevertheless "deprive[d] the customer of 'the abil-
ity to utilize and compare prices' ,;198 similarly, in Indiana Federation
of Dentists, the defendants' actions "disrupt[ed] the proper function-
ing of the price-setting mechanism of the market."'199 The ability to
disrupt the market's price-setting mechanism is, of course, market
power.2° Thus Professional Engineers and Indiana Federation of
Dentists recognized that price can be raised by restricting available
information as well as by controlling price directly.201 Similarly, the
tie in Kodak was imposed by making information regarding the costs
of a tie more difficult to obtain rather than by directly forcing consum-
ers to accept the tie. In a sense, therefore, Professional Engineers and
Indiana Federation of Dentists were analogous to traditional price-fix-
ing cases in the same way that Kodak was to a traditional tying case.
Not surprisingly, the Court consistently held in all three cases that a
seller may not accomplish indirectly through information restrictions
what it would not be permitted to accomplish directly through the ex-
ercise of other forms of market power.
4. Legitimate Business Justifications
Although tie-ins remain nominally per se violations of the anti-
trust laws, the Supreme Court has in the past accepted 202 and contin-
198. Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692-93 (quoting United States v. National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C. 1975), affd, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir.
1977), affd, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)). See supra text accompanying notes 192-93.
199. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461-62. See supra text accompanying
note 197.
200. See supra note 54.
201. See Lande, supra note 126, at 195 ("Imperfect information can be the equivalent of
traditional market share-based market power.").
Commentators have discussed the relationship of other information-related practices
and market power. See Beales et al., supra note 89, at 509 (discussing relationship between
advertising and market power); Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M.P. King, Private Creden-
tialing of Health Care Personnek An Antitrust Perspective (parts 1 & 2), 9 AM. J.L. & MED.
131, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 264 (1983) (contending that medical specialty certification, nomi-
nally an information-providing activity, is actually designed to resist pressures from both
outside and inside the profession to provide information that would allow consumers to
differentiate among physicians); Mark R. Patterson, Antitrust Liability for Collective
Speech. Medical Society Practice Standards, 27 IND. L. REv. 51 passim (1993) (arguing that
medical societies' statements to the public and insurers regarding particular medical prac-
tices can be used to disadvantage competitors).
202. See United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 558-61 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
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ues to consider 03 benefits provided by a tie as factors to consider in
determining its legality. Perhaps the most frequently offered justifica-
tion for tying arrangements is that they allow the manufacturer to
maintain the quality of its products by controlling the quality of the
other products or services that are used with them. The difficulties
just pointed out regarding manufacturer control of product informa-
tion suggest, however, that the informational effects of quality claims
should be closely scrutinized.
For example, Kodak stated that "by preventing customers from
using ISOs, 'it [can] best maintain high quality service for its sophisti-
cated equipment' and avoid being 'blamed for an equipment malfunc-
tion, even if the problem is the result of improper diagnosis,
maintenance or repair by an ISO.' "24 The Court did not consider
this justification in the context of the ISOs' tying claim under Section
1 of the Sherman Act, presumably because of that claim's per se char-
acter,20 5 but it did discuss a quality justification with regard to the re-
lated Sherman Act Section 2 monopolization claim.20 6 The Court held
that the quality argument did not preclude the monopolization claim
for two reasons. First, the respondents offered evidence that the
"ISOs provide quality service and are preferred by some Kodak
equipment owners. ' 20 7 Second, the Court questioned Kodak's con-
tention that its equipment owners would be unable to assess the rela-
tive quality of Kodak and ISO service.208
The first point raised by the Court addressed Kodak's claim as a
product justification: As a factual matter, did Kodak service really
improve the overall quality of the product?2 9 The Court rejected Ko-
203. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2088:
We need not decide whether Kodak's behavior has any procompetitive effects
and, if so, whether they outweigh the anticompetitive effects. We note only that
Kodak's service and parts policy is simply not one that appears always or almost
always to enhance competition, and therefore to warrant a legal presumption
without any evidence of its actual economic impact.
204. Id. at 2091 (quoting Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 6-7, Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992) (No. 90-1029)).
205. See supra note 203.
206. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2091-92.
207. Id. at 2091.
208. Id.
209. Sellers seem to make this claim reflexively, regardless of its merits. For example,
the author has heard it made by a manufacturer of safety-related products, where quality
would, of course, be of special importance. The manufacturer claimed that the purpose of
its refusal to sell parts to ISOs and its requirement that buyers who needed parts for their
systems buy them through it, rather than through ISOs, was to ensure that they were or-
dering the proper parts for their systems. (The ISOs claimed that the policy was instituted
merely to make ISO repair services more difficult to perform.) The manufacturer said that
its policies furthered this goal because it could cross-check the part ordered with the manu-
1994]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
dak's argument that this justification precluded liability at summary
judgment because, it said, its truth was a question of fact.210 The rea-
sons for rejecting the argument are even stronger. The basic assump-
tion of the antitrust laws is that consumers should be left to choose the
products that they wish to purchase, and the laws generally reject sell-
ers' attempts to dictate those choices.211 That should be as true where
the restraint at issue is a tie as when it involves an agreement among
suppliers. In fact, in both contexts the Court has said that quality jus-
tifications will not be permitted. In National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States,21 2 where a group of professionals agreed to
restrict their bidding practices, the Court firmly rejected their argu-
ment that the agreement was necessary to maintain quality and safety:
"The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating re-
sources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain-
quality, service, safety, and durability-and not just the immediate
cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among
alternative offers. ' 213 The Court took a similar view in the tying con-
text of Jefferson Parish, where it considered the possibility that the
defendant hospital might have required that patients use particular
anesthesiologists for reasons of quality, but "reject[ed] the view...
that the legality of an arrangement of this kind turns on whether it was
adopted for the purpose of improving patient care." '214 The rejected
quality claims in Professional Engineers and Jefferson Parish were just
as plausible as the claim in Kodak, so the Kodak justification should
have met with a similarly rapid dismissal without inquiry into its fac-
tual basis.
The Court's second rationale regarding the Kodak claim was
more supportable. It is indeed important that consumers be able to
assess the quality implications of the products that they buy. There-
fore, any actions that sellers take to make that choice easier should be
encouraged, but such actions would include only those that conveyed
information, not those that dictated a particular quality level. Kodak's
tie of service to parts and equipment did not meet that criterion. The
Kodak tie incorporated none of the risk-sharing aspects that could
facturer's record of the exact equipment owned. When asked by its attorneys whether it
actually performed the claimed cross-checking, however, the manufacturer replied that it
did not.
210. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2091.
211. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
212. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
213. Id. at 695.
214. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. 2, 25 n.41 (1984).
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have provided a signal to help buyers judge quality.215 In order to
provide a signal of quality useful to its buyers, Kodak would have had
to assume some of the financial risk of providing service to them,
216
but it did not; on the contrary, any lack of equipment quality or ser-
vice would have been fully felt by Kodak equipment owners in in-
creased service costs or decreased productivity. If Kodak had truly
intended to inform consumers regarding the quality of its products,
rather than to force them to buy products of a particular quality, it
would have provided a warranty217 or offered some other purchase
plan that served an informational role. Merely requiring buyers to use
Kodak service, at whatever price Kodak chose to charge for it, hardly
served Kodak's stated goal of improving buyers' ability to compare
Kodak and ISO service.
V. OTHER INFORMATION-BASED RESTRAINTS
The preceding sections of this Article have focused almost exclu-
sively on Kodak. To place the discussion in a broader context, this
part discusses a variety of cases that presented potentially anticompe-
titive problems analogous to those in Kodak. In only one such case,
however, was this anticompetitive potential realized, because in only
that case, described in the first section below, were both information
and switching costs present.21 The remaining three sections discuss
circumstances in which, despite some similarities to Kodak, there was
an absence of switching costs, or of information costs, or of both. In
215. See Wollenberg, supra note 184, at 753-56 (discussing quality control and risk-shar-
ing as an explanation for tying arrangements).
216. The theory of "signaling" has been discussed in detail by Michael Spence. See A.
MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFEJR IN HIRING AND RE-
LATED SCREENING PROCESSES (1974); Spence, supra note 68. Signals, according to Spence,
are "activities or attributes of [sellers] in a market which, by design or accident, alter the
beliefs of, or convey information to, [buyers] in the market." SPENCE, supra, at 1. The
example that he discusses most extensively is that of educational level and performance as
a signal of worker productivity. Id. at 14-30. He develops a model that demonstrates that
under certain assumptions educational achievement can serve as an effective signal for
both buyer and seller, even if neither actively seeks to use it as such. But "[t]he critical
assumption is that the costs of acquiring [the characteristic that is the signal] are negatively
correlated with the individual's productive capability with respect to some job." Id. at 15.
This condition is a necessary one; if it is absent, those sellers who have less of whatever
attribute it is that buyers truly desire will be able to send the signal as effectively (cheaply)
as those buyers prefer, and the signal will be useless. In education, the costs associated
with acquiring the signal are the expense and effort required t6 attain a high educational
level. For Kodak, the same role would have to be played by some characteristic of the tie
that would impose higher costs on Kodak if its product quality was low.
217. See infra text accompanying notes 275-77.
218. The relative rarity of such cases suggests that commentators' claims that Kodak
opened up vast new vistas of liability, see supra note 7, are exaggerated.
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none of these circumstances, therefore, was there a danger of informa-
tion-based market power, though the plaintiffs in some cases brought
Kodak-based claims.
A. Virtual Maintenance: Information and Switching Costs
As described above,219 an information restraint creates market
power only if it causes buyers to face both information and switching
costs. I am aware of only one reported case, in addition to Kodak, in
which both costs appeared to be present. That case is Virtual Mainte-
nance, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc.,220 which was vacated by the
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Kodak.221 The defend-
ant in Virtual Maintenance, Prime Computer, Inc., manufactured com-
puter systems and provided hardware maintenance for those systems,
one of which was known as the 50 Series.' Ford Motor Company
had developed a computer program, called PDGS, to aid in the design
of Ford's products; Ford's own version of PDGS ran only on Prime 50
Series computers .2 1 Ford licensed Prime as the exclusive distributor
of a modified version of PDGS to Ford's suppliers, whom it required
to use PDGS.12 4 Prime was also responsible for distributing PDGS
software updates, which Ford required its suppliers to use.2z Prime
offered the software support as a package with Prime's own hardware
maintenance services for the 50 Series computers for $16,000 per year;
PDGS users could also purchase the software support separately, but
only at a cost of more than $80,000.26 The plaintiff, an ISO, sued
Prime, claiming that Prime's policy of making PDGS software support
available by itself only at a price prohibitively higher than that of the
software support with hardware maintenance was in effect a tie, and
was illegal. 22 7
The ISO's claim in Virtual Maintenance was analogous to the
ISOs' claims in Kodak, with the Prime 50 Series computers occupying
the role of Kodak equipment, PDGS software updates playing the role
of Kodak parts, and the tied product in both cases being hardware
maintenance services. In its first consideration of the case, the Sixth
219. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
220. 957 F.2d 1318 (6th Cir.), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992), decision on remand, 995
F.2d 1324 (6th Cir. 1993).
221. See Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992).
222. Virtual Maintenance, 957 F.2d at 1321.
223. Id. at 1321-22.






Circuit rejected Virtual's claims on the basis that a single brand could
not constitute a relevant antitrust market?2 On remand, the court
recognized that Kodak had rejected its earlier view,2 2 9 and it ex-
amined the factual circumstances of the markets at issue. In consider-
ing switching costs, the court observed that Ford suppliers were locked
in to their Prime 50 series computers and training, citing expert testi-
mony that most of a supplier's investments "would be substantially
worthless if the [supplier] switched to another manufacture[r]'s sys-
tem."' 0 Although the court should then have addressed the informa-
tion costs faced by the suppliers, it did not, instead obliquely
indicating that it did not consider such costs relevant because "the
initial decision to purchase Prime equipment and software was made
by a single consumer, Ford."'231
Contrary to the Virtual Maintenance court's statement, though,
information costs did present a problem for the Ford suppliers. The
court's statement that Ford made the initial purchasing decision is
true, but it does not answer the relevant question. Although Ford
made the initial decision to require Prime equipment,2 2 each supplier
made its own individual decision to purchase that equipment, based
on its expectations regarding the equipment's likely expense and the
expected revenues from Ford. The Ford suppliers were thus in exactly
the same situation as Kodak equipment buyers. Like buyers of Kodak
equipment, buyers of Prime 50 series computers and Ford-approved
PDGS software were forced to use hardware maintenance of uncer-
tain cost provided by the hardware manufacturer, at the alternative of
an expensive switch to another brand of equipment (or, in Virtual
Maintenance, abandonment of Ford as a customer213).234 Both infor-
mation and switching costs were present, so the trial court in Virtual
228. Id. at 1326-29.
229. Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc. 995 F.2d 1324, 1329 (1992).
230. Id. at 1330.
231. Id. at 1329.
232. Although the ISO's claim in Virtual Maintenance was apparently based on business
that it lost from Ford suppliers, rather than from Ford itself, Ford was in much the same
position as its suppliers with regard to switching and information costs. The court noted
that Ford also felt locked in to its choice of Prime, because it too had made considerable
investments in both the software and the equipment. Id. at 1330. Ford also faced the same
information costs faced by its suppliers, both directly, to the extent that it was forced to
comply with Prime's marketing policy, and indirectly, through costs passed through its sup-
pliers. However, because Ford's overall costs for its Prime systems included the amounts it
spent in developing PDGS, its information costs were probably a smaller fraction of its
total costs than they were for its suppliers. An information-cost claim by Ford would
therefore probably have been less successful than one by the suppliers.
233. Ford suppliers, if dissatisfied with Prime hardware maintenance and unwilling to
pay the price of obtaining PDGS support alone, could have continued to use their Prime
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Maintenance, like that in Kodak, should determine whether the costs
were sufficient to create market power.235
B. The Importance of Switching Costs
As described earlier, 6 the Supreme Court's rejection of an infor-
mation-cost argument in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde 2 3 7 was appropriate because switching costs were absent in that
case. Although Jefferson Parish did not involve an aftermarket tie like
that in Kodak, the importance of switching costs is quite general. The
first section below discusses a case much like Kodak, but in which
switching costs were absent, so that no information-based market
power was created. The subsequent section extends the principles dis-
cussed in this Article from tie-ins to nonprice vertical restraints, a re-
lated area in which the competitive effects of the restraints depend on
the presence of switching costs.
1. Aftermarket lying Without Switching Costs
Data General Corporation, a computer manufacturer, has used a
hardware maintenance policy that is similar in some respects to Ko-
dak's, and Data General's policy has also been the subject of litiga-
tion.38 Like Kodak, Data General provided hardware maintenance
and repair for its equipment, and faced competition from ISOs.23 9 In
computers for other purposes, but they could not have continued to supply products to
Ford. See supra text accompanying note 225.
234. There is one possible distinction between Virtual Maintenance and Kodak, how-
ever. As noted supra in the text accompanying note 226, the annual price of the software
support-hardware maintenance package was $16,000. If that was a fixed price that covered
any maintenance needed by Prime's customers, it would have reduced considerably the
uncertainty associated with the tied package. See supra part IV.B.3. It is more likely,
though, that $16,000 was the price for software support only, on the condition that custom-
ers used Prime maintenance. In that case, the customers would have been subject to the
full uncertainty regarding Prime's maintenance quality and cost, and the case would have
been strictly like Kodak.
235. On calculating information-based market power, see supra part IV.A.2.
236. See supra part IV.B.1.
237. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
238. Data General's policy has been litigated in Maryland and Massachusetts. The
Maryland case is reported at Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680 (4th
Cir. 1992). The Massachusetts case, in which the author was involved, is reported at Data
Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., No. 93-1637, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25459
(1st Cir. Sept. 14, 1994). Both courts of appeals rejected antitrust liability, but on grounds
different from those disscussed here. Specifically, each decided that there was insufficient
evidence that any Data General computer owner's failure to use ISO service was the prod-
uct of an agreement not to do so, as required by Sherman Act § 1, to take the case the case
to trial under that section. See Service & Training, 963 F.2d at 686; Data Gen., No. 93-1637,
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25459 at *104-09.
239. Service & Training, 963 F.2d at 682.
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the course of developing a series of computers designated the MV
series, Data General had also developed a computer program, called
MV/ADEX, useful in diagnosing problems in the computers. 240 Data
General used MV/ADEX when providing hardware maintenance for
its customers, but it did not license MV/ADEX for use by ISOs. 241
The ISOs claimed, therefore, that Data General was tying its hard-
ware maintenance to MV/ADEX,242 which they alleged was very valu-
able for MV service.243
The Data General cases are similar to Kodak, with MV/ADEX
playing the tying-product role of Kodak parts. However, there is an
essential difference between the two cases. In Kodak, because Kodak
parts were unique and were necessary for the operation of Kodak
equipment,244 equipment owners had no choice but to continue
purchasing those parts. They were therefore forced to accept the tie
of parts to service as long as they owned Kodak equipment; they could
not switch from Kodak service without switching to another brand of
equipment. In Data General, though, the MV/ADEX diagnostic pro-
gram was not necessary for the operation of Data General MV com-
puters.2 45 MV/ADEX's usefulness in servicing Data General
computers may have made it less desirable for the computer owners to
switch to ISO service, but they could have done so without switching
to another brand of equipment, unlike Kodak owners.246 Giving up
the use of MV/ADEX was merely the price that Data General com-
puter owners paid for the lower cost of ISO service. If at any time
those owners decided that the overall ISO service package (without
MV/ADEX) was more attractive than the Data General package
(with MV/ADEX), they were free to switch. Therefore, as in Jefferson
Parish, the absence of switching costs in Data General rendered any
240. Id.
241. Id. at 683.
242. Id.
243. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Syss. Support Corp., 761 F. Supp. 185, 191-92 (D.
Mass. 1991), affid, No. 93-1637, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25459 (1st Cir. Sept. 14, 1994).
244. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
245. Actually, the ISOs suggested that MV/ADEX was essential to service Data Gen-
eral computers, or at least that computer schematics essential to developing alternatives to
MV/ADEX had also been withheld from them, see Data Gen., 761 F. Supp. at 191-92 but
the ISOs eventually developed diagnostic programs of their own, Brief of Plaintiff-Appel-
lee Data General Corp. at 28, Data Gen., No. 93-1637, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25459. Cf.
Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279-85 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that
Kodak, when introducing a new film format, had no obligation to disclose, before its intro-
duction, details of the new format to competing camera makers, even though camera mak-
ers needed format information to begin the design and manufacture of new cameras), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
246. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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information costs harmless. The uncertainty of the comparative costs
of hardware maintenance received from Data General and that re-
ceived from ISOs might have been as great as the analogous differ-
ence in Kodak, but Data General computer users were not required to
make an irrevocable purchasing decision in the face of that
uncertainty.247
2. Nonprice Vertical Restraints
Some of the considerations relevant to tying cases are also appli-
cable to cases involving other nonprice vertical restraints. The funda-
mental feature of both tie-ins and other vertical restraints is the
seller's definition of the manner in which its products will be sold to
customers. In tying cases, the seller accomplishes this by requiring the
buyer to purchase a particular brand (usually the seller's own) of some
second product, thus producing a two-product combination. With
nonprice vertical restraints, the seller's approach is less direct: The
seller imposes on its dealers certain restraints (e.g., as to the number
of dealers in a particular geographic area) in the expectation 248 that
the dealers will then provide to buyers certain benefits (e.g., better
service) that will in turn make the seller's product more attractive.249
Thus, the seller attempts to define its product to include (at least the
option of)250 the extra benefits that the restraints induce the dealers to
provide.
Broadly speaking, both kinds of cases reduce competition at the
aftermarket or dealer level, but both are said by their defenders to
247. A separate issue might have been uncertainty regarding Data General's policy re-
garding the licensing of MV/ADEX. However, there was no allegation that Data General
had misled buyers of its computers to think that they would be able to use MV/ADEX with
ISO service. Even if Data General had previously licensed MV/ADEX to ISOs, and cus-
tomers had relied on that policy in buying Data General equipment, a change in policy to
discontinue that licensing would not have imposed information costs of the kind discussed
in this Article. The possibility of the loss of MV/ADEX could have been anticipated, given
Data General's control over the program, and if its use was important to consumers, they
could have contracted for it. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
248. Vertical restraints present an enforcement problem. The theory usually applied to
explain how these restraints provide improved service is that by reducing inter-dealer com-
petition they provide the dealer with an extra rate of return that the dealer would prefer to
continue receiving. See Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Con-
tract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 265-66 (1988). That return is the
manufacturer's incentive to the dealer to provide improved service. However, the dealer
would prefer to have the extra return without providing the improved service, so the man-
ufacturer must monitor to ensure that the services are provided. Id. at 277-79.
249. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 38-39 (1977).




increase competition at the manufacturer levelY1' ]In both cases, the
restrictions are justified on the ground that they are needed to prevent
free-riding-by aftermarket suppliers in tying cases, 2 and by dealers
that do not provide desired services in vertical restraint cases.253 Also
in both cases, there are information-cost problems, in that consumers
may be forced to pay higher prices due to the restrictions imposed,
despite the consumers' inability to determine whether those higher
prices will provide them with compensating benefits.
Nonprice vertical restraints do not generally present a problem of
information-based market power, however, because they usually do
not create switching costs. There is typically nothing to prevent a
buyer, after purchase, from seeking aftermarket services either from a
non-dealer or from a dealer who does not conform to the manufac-
turer's requirement." 4 So long as such switching is possible, the buyer
need not continue to pay for services she does not find valuable, and
the seller will not be able to extract supracompetitive prices.
In some circumstances, though, nonprice restraints can impose
both information and switching costs. If, for example, a manufacturer
251. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-55. The defendant in Kodak relied heavily (but unsuc-
cessfully) on Sylvania in defending its own tying practice. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Im-
age Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 n.18 (1992) (citing Kodak's reliance on
Sylvania).
252. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2092.
253. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55.
254. For that very reason, dealers subject to vertical restraints usually extract the price
premium necessitated by the restraints in the primary market, so that consumers cannot
avoid it. This is true, for example, of stereo equipment, where "audiophile" brands sold by
a limited number of approved dealers must be sold at prices high enough to cover those
dealers' customer services because buyers, if they choose, can easily go to other, less-ex-
pensive repair shops for service.
In general, the imposition of the premium at the time of the initial purchase, rather
than in the service aftermarket, would reduce information costs, regardless of whether
switching costs were present. Professor Grimes, however, suggests that this sort of ar-
rangement could impose other costs on consumers by creating incentives for dealers to
promote inferior goods. See Warren S. Grimes, Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Qual-
ity: Vertical Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL. L. Rnv. 817, 825-40 (1992) (discussing price
restraints, but with reasoning also applicable to nonprice restraints). Consumers might
therefore be convinced to make purchases that, though at known prices, would be of unex-
pectedly low quality. Id. at 825-28. This situation could create information costs, because
consumers would suffer from the low-quality goods promoted by the dealers. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that this would not be a problem derived from the structure of the
market, as are the information-cost problems discussed in this Article; it would instead be a
simple consumer-protection problem. Cf. infra part V.C.1 (discussing information
problems not created by ties). Professor Grimes recognizes this but argues that the anti-
trust laws are nevertheless an efficient means of addressing the problem. Grimes, supra, at
837-40. That is perhaps so, but the arguments set forth in this Article need not rely on any
such pragmatic considerations: They fit squarely within the sort of market problems at
which the antitrust laws are directed.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
refused to provide replacement parts to dealers who did not meet its
requirements, the restraint could present competitive dangers. Such a
situation would present conditions exactly analogous to Kodak, except
that the high-priced service-required if the buyer wanted to obtain
parts-would come from a group of dealers controlled by the seller,
rather than only from the seller itself. A similar situation was
presented in In re General Motors Corp. 1 5 In that case, the Federal
Trade Commission challenged a policy of General Motors under
which it distributed body "crash" parts only to its franchised dealers,
who charged considerable markups when reselling those parts to in-
dependent body shops.z 6 General Motors customers had no choice
but to pay the high prices created by this policy, either directly
through high-priced dealer service or indirectly through the high parts
prices to independent shops, despite the fact that General Motors did
not even claim that the policy increased quality and stated instead that
it had instituted the policy for administrative convenience.z 7 Despite
what it called "a troubling degree of injury to competition," the Com-
mission excused General Motors's practice on the basis of its business
justification of administrative savings.? s If those savings reduced con-
sumers' overall costs, the decision was no doubt correct, but there are
certainly other possibilities25 9 The most relevant here is that the pol-
icy might have allowed General Motors to charge a lower price for
cars while maintaining its profit level by allowing its dealers less re-
turn on car sales and compensating them through higher returns on
body shop parts and services. To the extent that consumers could not
obtain information regarding the higher-priced body repair services to
which they might be subject, the policy would have created informa-
tion costs; consumers would have been induced to purchase General
Motors cars by their low initial prices, but then would have been sub-
jected to supracompetitive aftermarket body-shop prices.2 60 The com-
255. 99 F.T.C. 464 (1982). General Motors might perhaps be thought of not as a vertical
restraint case, but as one involving a refusal to deal or some other similarly defined prac-
tice. However, it clearly is of the nature of a vertical restraint when looked at as an insis-
tence that its crash part dealers also provide the other services of a franchised dealer. To
paraphrase Sylvania, the policy thus qualifies as a practice intended "to reduce but not to
eliminate competition among [General Motors's] retailers through the adoption of a
franchise system." Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 46.
256. General Motors, 99 F.T.C. at 554.
257. Id. at 606.
258. Id. at 610.
259. Commissioner Pertschuk dissented from the Commission's opinion, arguing that
General Motors had not met its burden of showing the legitimacy of its business justifica-
tion. ld. at 615-18 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting).
260. It actually seems unlikely that General Motors would have created a significant
information-cost problem, both because consumers could probably have informed them-
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bination of these information costs and the cost to car owners of
switching to another car could then have created market power for
General Motors in much the same way as market power was created
in Kodak.26'
C. Tying and the Creation of Information Costs
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his Kodak dissent, the circum-
stances in which a buyer is unexpectedly locked in to the products or
services of a particular seller are far broader than aftermarket tying.262
In most of those circumstances, however, the lock-in is not imposed,
as it was in Kodak, by a tie that at the same time defines a product in
such a way as to create information costs. Justice Scalia made no at-
tempt to show that the circumstances he described fit this mold, and in
fact they did not. The first section below discusses the quite different
circumstances cited by Justice Scalia, where the information costs to
which a buyer is subject would be present regardless of how the prod-
uct is defined; in these circumstances, a tie does not worsen the
buyer's position, and therefore does not create market power. The
subsequent section discusses the situation in which a seller does define
its product with a tie that has informational effects, but the seller takes
active steps to reduce information costs.
1. Tying with Pre-existing Information Costs
The examples of "circumstantial" lock-in power that Justice
Scalia cited are unlike Kodak in that they do not involve products
selves regarding the costs of body repair services and because the cost differences between
such repair services would be unlikely, for a typical buyer, to approach five percent of an
automobile's total price. See supra text accompanying notes 148-53.
261. A rationale that could be offered to reject information-based liability in General
Motors was described in Kodak. The Court in Kodak rejected Kodak's analogy between its
tying practice and nonprice vertical restraints, because, it said, Kodak itself competed with
the dealers that were disadvantaged by the tie, in contrast to a vertical restraint case (like
General Motors), in which restraints are imposed at the dealer level, where the manufac-
turer generally does not compete. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112
S. Ct. 2072, 2084 n.18 (1992). This is not a relevant distinction, however. The fact that
General Motors did not compete with either its franchised dealers or with independent
body shops did not mean that it could not have profited from its restrictive parts sales
policy. As the text describes, the higher prices charged by General Motors dealers for
parts sold to independent body shops might have allowed the dealers to charge supracom-
petitive prices for their body repair services. That, in turn, would have resulted in excess
profits, some of which the dealer could have returned to General Motors, in effect as an
incentive to continue the parts sales policy. Cf supra note 83 (noting similar phenomena in
the related area of long-term contracts).
262. See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
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specilically defined in such a way that their valuation is difficult.263
Representative is his reference to "the leverage held by an airplane
manufacturer over an airline that has 'standardized' its fleet around
the manufacturer's models." 264 In this and Justice Scalia's other ex-
amples,2 65 the sellers' ability to exploit buyers arises-as it does in
Kodak-from the buyers' investments in the sellers' products, but-
unlike Kodak-the buyers' investment decisions are not made more
difficult by the sellers' definitions of their products. Justice Scalia's
airline example, for instance, is roughly equivalent to an exploitation
by Kodak of its equipment owners through a simple parts price in-
crease, not through a tie of service to parts and equipment. The for-
mer method exploits buyers in a straightforward way, apparent to and
assessable by buyers; the latter obscures the exploitation behind the
difficulty of calculating service costs.
The information-based distinction here is critical. In the absence
of traditional non-information-based market power, an undisguised
exploitation of buyers is not possible. Only if the exploitation is made
difficult to anticipate, so that the buyer makes her purchase and is
locked in to supracompetitive prices before she can determine that the
prices are supracompetitive, can a seller create market power through
information. This point distinguishes Kodak not only from Justice
Scalia's examples, but also from several cases that have been cited in
arguing that Kodak was in error.266
263. Actually, one of Justice Scalia's examples, "the leverage held by the swimming
pool contractor when he discovers a 5-ton boulder in his customer's backyard and demands
an additional sum of money to remove it," Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2098 (Scalia, J., dissenting),
does not involve lock-in at all. Although the swimming pool example presents information
costs (the inability to anticipate the presence of the boulder), the customer could presuma-
bly freely switch to another contractor at the time the boulder is discovered. (If the con-
tract provided for a penalty if the customer switched, there might be antitrust implications.
See supra note 83.). Justice Scalia might respond that the swimming-pool customer would
incur switching costs if she chose to abandon the pool entirely, but that goes further than
the arguments presented in Kodak. The argument of the ISOs in Kodak was that Kodak
equipment owners would incur costs in switching from Kodak copiers to other brands with
which they could use ISO service; they did not claim that the costs that copier owners
would sacrifice if they abandoned copiers altogether had antitrust significance.
264. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2098 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265. The other examples are "the leverage held by a drill press manufacturer whose
customers have built their production lines around the manufacturer's particular style of
drill press; the leverage held by an insurance company over its independent sales force that
has invested in company-specific paraphernalia; or the leverage held by a mobile home
park owner over his tenants, who are unable to transfer their homes to a different park
except at great expense." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266. The two cases discussed below, Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc.,
866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 847 (1989), and Town Sound & Custom
Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 196 (1992), were both cited by Justice Scalia in his Kodak dissent. See Kodak, 112 S.
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First among these cases is Parts & Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling
Electric, Inc.267 In his Kodak dissent, Justice Scalia cited Judge Pos-
ner's dissenting opinion in Sterling.26 In that case, Sterling, a motor
manufacturer, instituted a new policy that required dealers that car-
ried its parts to also purchase a certain number of its motors.269 This
policy was, for both the dealers and Sterling motor owners, an unan-
ticipated aftermarket tie. However, from the perspective of the deal-
ers, one of which brought the claim, the tie imposed no information
costs at all. At no point was a dealer required to make a purchasing
decision that was made more difficult by the tie. Before the tie, the
dealer was able to decide independently whether to sell Sterling parts
and motors, based on its expected profits from each; after the tie,
although it was required to decide whether to carry both parts and
motors or to carry neither, it needed only to assess its collective profits
from both. Therefore, the information needed for the post-tie deci-
sion was no more difficult to obtain than was the information for the
pre-tie decisions, and the tie created no information-cost problem.
As a closer analogy to Kodak, one can also consider the Sterling
tie from the perspective of Sterling motor owners. Although the tie,
by imposing a restraint on parts dealers, no doubt had the indirect
effect of raising parts prices, from the perspective of motor owners
that effect was no different from a unilateral parts price increase im-
posed by the dealers or by Sterling itself. As such, unlike the Kodak
tie, Sterling's tie did not make the calculation of overall lifecycle cost
more difficult. In fact, the calculation process before the tie and after
it were exactly the same-only the numbers (parts prices) in the calcu-
lation differed. Hence, the Sterling tie also did not create informa-
tion-based market power over Sterling motor owners.
Despite the two cases' differences, Sterling resembled Kodak in
that it did impose an unexpected aftermarket tie. The other case to be
discussed here did not, though the plaintiff claimed that the defend-
ant's tie made its purchasing decisions more difficult. In Town Sound
& Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.270 the plaintiff argued
that Chrysler's inclusion of an automobile radio as standard equip-
Ct. at 2098, 2100 (citing Sterling), 2097, 2098 (citing Town Sound) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp also quote extensively from Judge Posner's dissenting
opinion in Sterling in their critique of Kodak. See AREEDA & HovmnmAmp, supra note 4,
1709.2(f).
267. 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988).
268. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2098 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Sterling, 866 F.2d at 236
(Posner, J., dissenting).
269. Sterling, 866 F.2d at 229.
270. 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 196 (1992).
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ment in its cars was an illegal tie because it made it more difficult for
consumers "to evaluate the true cost of the car and the sound system
apart from the package."27 This claim was rightly rejected by the
Third Circuit, though, because Town Sound consumers knew exactly
what they were paying for the car-and-radio combination.2 72 There
was therefore no reason why they could not easily compare their pos-
sible Chrysler purchases with other car-and-radio (or car-alone2 73)
purchases. As with Sterling's requirement that dealers make a single
decision whether to sell both parts and motors, there was no creation
of information costs, and hence no information-based market
power.274
271. Town Sound,-959 F.2d at 491. This was an argument that the Third Circuit appar-
ently pursued more vigorously than did the plaintiff itself. See id. at 490 (introducing the
argument with the statement that "[tihe plaintiff's theory of harm that troubles us most is
one that they have pressed only weakly since filing their complaint").
272. The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion, stating that the facts in Town
Sound did not present a problem of information-based market power, because Chrysler
buyers "know what they need to know to evaluate how good a deal they are getting for
what they are buying." Id. at 491 (footnote omitted). The court of appeals also noted that
car buyers know from the sticker price or the salesperson exactly what price they
have to pay for what Chrysler car-for the package, including vehicle body, op-
tions, and autosound system. . . .We do not see why the buyer should care
whether the underlying prices for a $10,000 car package are $500 for the sound
system and $9,500 for the rest of the car, or $1,000 for the sound system and
$9,000 for the rest of the car. For antitrust purposes, it makes no difference.
Id.
273. Even if the buyer would have preferred to buy no radio, there was still no question
as to how much she would have had to pay for the car with its radio, though the arrange-
ment would obviously have been less desirable for her. This is actually something of an
oversimplification, in that if the buyer was uncertain regarding how much the radio would
have been worth to her (at resale, for example), the tie of the radio to the car would have
forced her to make that determination in order to reach a fully informed decisioin.
Although this seems like a minor concern in the case of a car, because the radio is of
considerably less value than the car, it might have presented a more significant problem in
Sterling. In that case, a dealer that wished to carry only Sterling parts (and not Sterling
Motors) would have been forced by the parts-motors tie to determine its expected profits
from motors as well as from parts to determine whether carrying both would be profitable.
That might in fact have made the dealer's purchasing decision more difficult, and might
therefore have given Sterling market power.
274. Somewhat similar was Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). The plaintiff in Photovest was a Fotomat fran-
chisee whose franchise agreement required that it purchase all its photo-processing serv-
ices from Fotomat, which represented that it would provide the services at cost, but in fact
sold them at a profit. Id. at 716, 719-20. The plaintiff s claim alleged that Fotomat's decep-
tion induced it to continue buying Fotomat photo-processing services when it would not
have done so with accurate information, and that the deception therefore made the tie
illegal. Id. at 723. However, although the plaintiff in Photovest perhaps paid more than it
would have if Fotomat had lived up to its bargain, there was no allegation that the plaintiff
was unable to ascertain exactly how much it was paying. The plaintiff s lack of information
therefore did not make it more difficult for it to calculate its costs.
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2. Tying and the Reduction of Information Costs
Sterling and Town Sound suggest that so long as buyers of tied
products are aware of the overall costs that they will pay, the ties do
not create information problems. That is largely correct, even for
aftermarket ties. For example, a seller seeking to impose an
aftermarket parts-and-service tie similar to that in Kodak could re-
duce the uncertainty associated with that tie considerably by charging
a fixed overall parts-and-service price, as with a long-term warranty.
Some uncertainty would still remain regarding service quality, and to
that extent market power would still be possible,275 but the reduction
in uncertainty provided by the fixed price would probably reduce
overall information costs below the market-power threshold. More-
over, a fixed price could indirectly reduce even quality uncertainty.
That is so because, with a fixed service price, it is in the seller's, as well
as the buyer's, interest to provide high-quality service, so as to mini-
mize the time and cost of service calls. The seller's villingness to pro-
vide service for a fixed price therefore in itself conveys quality
information to the buyer.276 Because the seller will rationally assume
the risk of providing fixed-price service only if quality is high, so that
the seller will profit from providing the service, the consumer can ra-
tionally rely on the seller's offer as a signal of quality.277 The fixed-
price tie of a warranty therefore provides a means for a seller to im-
pose an aftermarket tie without making the consumer's decision-mak-
ing process more difficult by creating information costs.
Moreover, a seller need not go so far as to fix future prices to
inform its buyers; it can instead simply provide estimates of future
costs. Although I am unaware of any case in which that has been
done for a simple tying arrangement, it is an approach provided for by
statute in the closely related area of franchise agreements. Franchise
agreements, like aftermarket ties, generally require the continued
long-term purchase of seller-selected goods or services as a condition
The Seventh Circuit rejected the Fotomat plaintiff's claims on somewhat similar
grounds. It said that the plaintiff's tying argument could only succeed if Fotomat had used
its market power in the tying market, Fotomat's trademarked franchise, to coerce the
plaintiff to purchase its photo-processing services. Id. at 723. That, the court said, Fotomat
did not do. The plaintiff purchased Fotomat's services because it believed (albeit due to
Fotomat's misrepresentations) that they were the least expensive such services available,
not because it was forced to do so to obtain or retain the Fotomat franchise. Id.
275. For example, the information costs represented in Table 1, see supra text accompa-
nying note 157, which do present a market-power problem, arise despite manufacturer
service costs that are fixed-or more precisely, that increase at a fixed rate.
276. See generally Grossman, supra note 67 (discussing role of product warranties).
277. See supra note 216.
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of the buyer's use of the seller's product, though in franchise arrange-
ments the tying product is usually the franchise trademark itself,
rather than a durable good.2 78 The franchise tie-in requirement is
generally justified on the ground that uniformity is needed to maintain
the value of the franchise trademark,2 79 but the true value of the re-
quired products to the franchisee is likely to be somewhat uncertain,
as are their costs over time. Thus, it is possible that, as with other ties,
a franchise could create information costs that distorted consumer
purchasing decisions.280 The franchise claim most analogous to Ko-
278. See, for example, the definitions of franchises in the Federal Trade Commission's
Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportu-
nity Ventures, 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1993). The most relevant of these definitions, for present
purposes, is the following:
The term franchise means any continuing commercial relationship created by
any arrangement or arrangements whereby:
(1)(i)(A) a person (hereinafter "franchisee") offers, sells, or distributes
to any person other than a "franchisor" (as hereinafter defined), goods, com-
modities, or services which are:
(1) Identified by a trademark, service mark, trade name, advertising or
other commercial symbol designating another person (hereinafter
"franchisor"); or
(2) Indirectly or directly required or advised to meet the quality stan-
dards prescribed by another person (hereinafter "franchisor") where the
franchisee operates under a name using the trademark, service mark, trade
name, advertising or other commercial symbol designating the franchisor;
and
(B)(1) The franchisor exerts or has authority to exert a significant de-
gree of control over the franchisee's method of operation, including but not
limited to, the franchisee's business organization, promotional activities,
management, marketing plan or business affairs; or
(2) The franchisor gives significant assistance to the franchisee in the
latter's method of operation, including, but not limited to, the franchisee's
business organization, management, marketing plan, promotional activities,
or business affairs; ...
and;
(2) The franchisee is required as a condition of obtaining or commencing the
franchise operation to make a payment or a commitment to pay to the franchisor,
or to a person affiliated with the franchisor.
16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a) (1993).
279. Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise 2 ing Con-
tracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345, 349-51 (1985).
280. On this point, one franchise case contained the following comments:
The franchisees' apparent willingness to pay the ultimate cost of the arrangement
is clouded by the fact that they may well have been unaware of what that cost
would come to in practice. Had the full amount of the over-charge on the tied
items been openly specified as the cost of the tying items, agreement might not
have been forthcoming.
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43,52-53 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955
(1972).
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dak28 1 would be one in which a franchisee claimed that she entered
into the franchise agreement, and agreed to purchase the required tied
products, at least in part because she was unable to determine how
expensive the package would be.282
However, as pointed out by Professor Hay in considering the im-
plications of Kodak for franchising, federal law requires that potential
franchisees be given information regarding the costs of a franchise." 3
The Federal Trade Commission has promulgated rules that require the
disclosure of a great deal of information regarding the franchise's fi-
nancial performance.2 4 The rules thus at least attempt to provide ex-
actly the information needed by a buyer to make an informed choice
regarding the product-they attempt to provide exactly the informa-
tion that was lacking in Kodak. The buyer would therefore suffer as
experience costs only those expenses that were not anticipated by the
required disclosure,2 85 and those unanticipated expenses might not be
sufficient to make an information-based claim viable. 8 6 A similar ap-
281. At least one commentator has expressed concern regarding the application of Ko-
dak to franchise agreements. See Hay, supra note 4.
282. Following the analysis of this Article, a franchisee bringing a Kodak-based claim
would have to show that there were unexpected expenses of a particular product or prod-
ucts within her franchise package that could have been avoided by using an alternative-
i.e., that there were experience costs-and that those expenses were sufficient to create the
market power that forced her to make the purchase. See supra part IV.A.1-2. Switching
costs would be present, as the result of the considerable initial investment necessary to
acquire a franchise.
283. Hay, supra note 4, at 188.
284. See Federal Trade Commission, Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Con-
cerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1993).
285. Because the availability of this information makes possible low-cost search, it elim-
inates much of the need to obtain information through experience. See supra note 149.
286. There is also another, more fundamental factor that might weaken an information-
based franchise tying claim. A franchisee's claim would be based on the franchisor's defi-
nition of its product (by requiring franchisees to purchase particular goods), but it is also
the franchisor's definition of the product that provides the uniformity that allows the
franchise trademark's value to be created and maintained. That fact makes it difficult for
the franchisee to argue that it was uncertainty regarding the value of the tied product that
caused her to make the purchase. It is perhaps more likely that it was the franchisor's
particular definition of the product, despite its uncertainty, that motivated the purchase.
This is, of course, the basic quality justification discussed supra part IV.B.4. The justi-
fication is more plausible in the franchise context than in most tying arrangements, see
Klein & Saft, supra note 279, at 346-48, but Kodak could also have argued that buyers
chose its equipment and accepted the necessity of using Kodak service not because of mar-
ket power derived from uncertainty regarding that service, but because of Kodak's reputa-
tion for long-term product quality, quality that it could maintain only by continuing to
require use of its service. To some extent, the validity of such a claim will never be an
entirely resolvable problem, due to the difficulty of determining product quality with and
without the tie. Nevertheless, there are some guidelines that can be used to evaluate
claims of quality control. One consideration is who stands to lose the most from low qual-
ity. In a case like Kodak, where the buyer has purchased a product for its own use, it is the
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
proach could, of course, be adopted by a non-franchise seller that
wanted to impose a tie: By providing information sufficient to esti-
mate the costs of the tie, the seller could foreclose the possibility of a
Kodak-like antitrust action.287
D. Lee v. Life Insurance Co.: Baseless Kodak Claims
As the two preceding sections showed, the presence of either in-
formation or switching costs alone is not sufficient to create informa-
tion-based market power. One would think, therefore, that plaintiffs
would not bring Kodak-like claims where neither information nor
switching costs were present. However, plaintiffs did exactly that in a
recent First Circuit case, Lee v. Life Insurance Co. of North
America.2- The plaintiffs, students at the University of Rhode Island
(URI), challenged URI's requirement that its students pay a fee for
the right to use URI's health clinic and that they be covered by health
insurance, for which URI provided a particularly economical pro-
gram.289 The students claimed that, after they entered URI, they were
locked in to continued enrollment 290 and that information costs were
present because they could not "know or predict their future [clinic
fees and insurance premiums] with any precision. '2 91
The First Circuit easily rejected the students' information and
switching costs claims. The court said that the students were aware of
the clinic and insurance charges at the time of their enrollment at URI
buyer who will suffer immediately from poor equipment performance, so it is difficult to
see why the determination of what is necessary to maintain equipment quality should be
left to the seller. In the franchise situation, on the other hand, skimping on quality by the
franchisee will (in the short-term, at least) save the franchisee money; the costs of lowered
quality will be imposed on the eventual consumer of the franchised product. It is possible
that in the long term the franchisee will also suffer from a loss of repeat customers, but that
will depend on the extent to which the franchisee can free-ride on the reputation of the
franchisor (and of other franchisees). See Klein & Saft, supra note 279, at 349-51. At best,
any loss of quality by the franchisee will be felt only indirectly. Hence, the tying arrange-
ments of a franchisor seem more reasonably justified by quality-control claims than do
those of Kodak.
287. It does not seem appropriate, however, to require a seller in Kodak's situation to
remedy the information deficiencies of its customers. (In fact, the relevant information
may not be available, even to the seller. See supra note 100.). See Craswell, supra note 80,
at 691-92 (discussing the possibility of disclosure requirement). Those deficiencies are to a
large extent an unavoidable characteristic of aftermarkets, and this Article proposes only
that the seller should not be permitted to exploit them through a tie. See supra note 169.
288. 23 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3192 (U.S. Sept. 27,
1994) (No. 94-468).
289. Id. at 15. URI's health insurance program was designed to cover only those costs
that its students' clinic fees did not cover. Id.
290. Id. at 18.
291. Id. at 19.
[Vol. 73
ANTITRUST
and that the charges were "subject to historically predictable annual
increases."' 92 Therefore, it said, the plaintiffs could raise no inference
that "the health-care and insurance-cost information . [was] either
difficult or expensive to obtain or correlate."293 As for switching costs,
the court said that "the 'college credit' value of the first semester
[was] neither nontransferable nor without economic or educational
value in the future even if the student [did] not remain at URI." '29 4
Because it rejected both the information-cost and switching-cost argu-
ments, the court rejected the students' Kodak claims.
Some commentators will no doubt point to Lee and its plaintiffs'
strained arguments as proof that Kodak has provided new opportunity
for groundless claims.295 But the case actually shows that it is easy to
dispose of such groundless claims. Lee was decided on a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
after "minimal discovery," 296 which suggests that an information-cost
claim will not necessarily require extensive (and expensive) discovery
if the plaintiff can point to no plausible sources of information and
switching costs.297 As time passes, and Kodak becomes better under-
stood, such cases will no doubt be brought only rarely, if at all. More-
over, under the approach of this Article, even Lee might not have
been brought. Recall that the approach advocated here requires a
showing of information and switching costs that meet a market-power
threshold when compared to overall costs in the primary market-
equipment in Kodak and URI educational services in Lee. The plain-
tiffs in Lee acknowledged that this condition was not met, stating that
"the prices charged for health clinic services and insurance premiums
[were] too insignificant in relation to tuition and other university-edu-
cation costs to be considered a meaningful factor in determining
whether potential applicants for admission will attend URI or some
other university. '298 That statement was an admission that the Lee
plaintiffs' claim could not meet the market-power test proposed here.
292. Id.
293. Id. (emphasis in original).
294. Id. at 20.
295. See supra note 7.
296. Lee, 23 F.3d at 15. Given the court's discussion of factual matters, the dismissal
was treated more as a summary judgment motion.
297. Lee placed the burden of alleging a plausible source of information costs on the
plaintiffs. Id. at 18-19. Because of the posture of the case, it, like Kodak, said nothing
about which party had the burden of proof on the issue.
298. Id. at 18.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has provided a detailed analysis of Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.2 9 9 The view of the case presented
here concurs with the result reached by the majority in Kodak, but
differs in some respects with its reasoning. The thesis of the Article is
that the combination of information costs and switching costs can cre-
ate market power of antitrust significance. The Article describes the
mechanisms by which information deficiencies can create such power,
and it outlines a method of calculating the degree of power in cases
like Kodak. Such a calculation presents no insuperable difficulties,
and it provides a framework for deciding these cases that the Court's
opinion did not supply.
Moving beyond the specifics of Kodak, the Article discusses more
generally the ability of sellers to define their products in such a way as
to create market power. This ability is made possible by a close inter-
relationship between a seller's definition of its product and the infor-
mation available regarding that product, a relationship that is present
in a variety of cases in addition to those involving tying arrangements.
The interaction between product definition and market information
can generate market power that is, from an economic point of view,
competitively significant and a valid subject of antitrust concern.
299. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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